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AN ADMINISTRATIVE "DEATH SENTENCE" FOR
ASYLUM SEEKERS: DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS
UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6)'S FRIVOLOUSNESS
STANDARD
E. Lea Johnston*
Abstract: In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act by providing
a new sanction for asylum seekers: if an immigration judge makes a finding that a noncitizen
has knowingly filed a fraudulent asylum application, then that person is permanently
ineligible for immigration benefits. For eleven years, immigration judges, the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and federal courts have imposed and reviewed this sanction without
specifying a burden of proof When it did act to fill the statutory gap in April 2007, the Board
held that the government must prove the elements of the statute by a preponderance of the
evidence. This Article argues that the Due Process Clause guarantees that the government
must prove that a noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application by clear and
convincing evidence before rendering him permanently ineligible for benefits. It also
proposes that immigration judges should consider only certain categories of evidence when
determining whether the government has established elements of the statute by clear and
convincing evidence, while other categories should be held ineligible as a matter of law.
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A.

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, prompted by national security and economic concerns
perceived to be associated with illegal immigration,' Congress enacted a
draconian 2 new sanction for any noncitizen found to have knowingly
1. For a detailed description of the media's portrayal of the asylum problem in the 1990s and of
Congress's response to this problem in 1994 and 1996, see Andrea Rogers, Exploitation v.
Expulsion: The Use of Expedited Removal in Asylum Cases As an Answer to a Compromised
System, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 785, 793-803 (1998).
2. See Luciana v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., No. 05-3544, 2007 WL 2696865, at *11 (3d Cir. Sept.
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filed a frivolous application for asylum. Congress amended section 208
of the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide that, if such an
application is filed, the noncitizen "shall be permanently ineligible for
any benefits" under United States immigration laws. 3 This sanction
applies regardless of any future developments in the asylum applicant's
home country or personal life that would otherwise provide a basis for
granting immigration benefits.4 For example, if the noncitizen returns to
his home country, leads a political movement, and fears persecution by
the ruling class, he will not be eligible to seek refuge here.5 Similarly, if,
in waiting for the immigration process to run its course, an asylum
seeker has married a United States citizen or given birth to children who
are United States citizens, an asylum seeker's family ties are of no
accord; she is no longer eligible for adjustment of status.6 The sanction
is so sweeping in its scope and implications that it fully deserves its
characterization by the courts as an administrative "death sentence" for
asylum seekers. 7
While the government has legitimate interests in rejecting and
deterring frivolous asylum applications, any governmental action must
comply with constitutional standards.8 The frivolousness statutory
17, 2007) (referring to sanction under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) as a "draconian penalty").
3. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-694 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § I 158(d)(6) (2000)).
4. See id.; see also Luciana, 2007 WL 2696865, at * 11 ("By additionally issuing a frivolousness
finding, the U [immigration judge] brought down on Petitioner a lifetime ban on all means of legally
entering the United States."); Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) ("A
finding of frivolousness is a potential 'death sentence' for an alien's immigration prospects.").
5. See Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that an immigration judge
found the petitioner's asylum application frivolous, "thereby barring a grant of asylum to petitioner
forever").
6. See Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that a finding under 8
U.S.C. § 11 58(d)(6) precludes an adjustment ofa noncitizen's status to permanent residence despite
the noncitizen's bona fide marriage to a United States citizen); see also Tchuinga v. Gonzales, 454
F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the Board of Immigration Appeals, in declining to reopen
the petitioner's case, concluded that the noncitizen was barred from adjusting his status due to the
frivolous asylum application bar).
7. See Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 397 n. 1(6th Cir. 2006); Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399
F.3d 582, 588 (3d Cir. 2005).
8. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (quoting James Madison for the
proposition that the judiciary, in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, "will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive" and will
"resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the
declaration of rights") (quoting James Madison, I Annals of Cong. 439 (1789)); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the
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provision-codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6)-is constitutionally
deficient as written and applied. Congress failed to specify which party
bears the burden of proof and what degree of certainty is required to
support a finding of frivolousness. 9 The Board of Immigration Appeals,
charged with the responsibility of administering and interpreting
immigration statutes,' 0 waited eleven years to fill these statutory gaps.
When it did act in April 2007, the Board-failing to acknowledge the
constitutional implications of its decision-established that the
government must prove that a noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous
asylum application by a preponderance of the evidence," a burden of
proof inconsistent with due process requirements. 1 2 The federal courts
have yet to remedy this error. Because the federal government has failed
to establish evidentiary standards that comport with due process,
application of this statutory provision constitutes a violation of an
asylum seeker's constitutional rights. The deprivation of rights is
amplified by the permanent and severe nature of the sanction, which
may lead to the direst of consequences.
In the current political climate-amid post-9/11 national security
concerns1 3 and fears of illegal immigrants displacing American jobs'1deterring and punishing noncitizens who attempt to enter our country5
through fraudulent means has become a matter of national importance'
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.").
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2000).
10. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a), (d)(l) (2007).
II. See In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 157-58 (B.I.A.2007).
12. See infra Part II.
13. The 9/11 Commission noted that one "central player" in the attack on September 11, 2001,
entered the United States with fraudulent documents and was granted political asylum. See THE
NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 72
(2004), available at http://www.9-l lcommission.gov/report/91IReport.pdf (discussing Ramzi
Yousef). Another coconspirator tried, and failed, to gain political asylum. Id. at 177-78 (discussing
Ahmed Ressam). The Report found, "Looking back, we can also see that the routine operations of
our immigration laws-that is, aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting against
terrorism-inevitably shaped al Qaeda's planning and opportunities." Id. at 384.
14. See, e.g., Lee Roop, Is Commission Stacked Against Reform?, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Sept. 26,
2007, at lB ("[P]eople say illegal immigrants aren't just taking unskilled jobs now; they are
climbing the skill ladder and doing, for less money, jobs Americans most definitely will do:
framing, dry-walling and plumbing, for example."); Jeremy Redmon, Day Labor Dispute: Hiring
Off the Curb? Not in Marietta;Critics Say Law Violates Key Rights, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 20,
2007, at I B; Letter, Who Will Defend Our Borders?, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Sept. 5, 2007, at B-05.
15. On May 9, 2007, in the First Session of the 110th Congress, Senators Reid, Leahy, Kennedy,
Menendez, and Salazar introduced Senate Bill 1348, which would impose significant new sanctions
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16
and a priority of immigration judges evaluating asylum applications.
For an immigration judge's finding of frivolousness to comply with the
mandates of the Constitution, federal courts of appeals must reject the
Board's proscribed burden of proof and order immigration courts to
provide procedural safeguards consistent with the dictates of Mathews v.
Eldridge. 7
This Article demonstrates that, to accord with constitutional
guarantees, the government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that a noncitizen knowingly filed a fraudulent asylum
application. This heightened evidentiary standard provides asylum
seekers with a vital safeguard to protect their fundamental liberty
interests and is generally consistent with the limited body of federal
appellate case law that has developed in this area. Part I of the Article
provides an overview of the asylum application process, the statutory
and regulatory structure governing findings of frivolousness, and the
judicial framework that has developed around § 1158(d)(6). Part II
assesses the liberty interests at stake in determinations that a noncitizen
has filed a frivolous asylum application, applies the balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge to determine that increased procedural safeguards
are necessary, and concludes that only the clear and convincing standard
satisfies due process. Part III advocates that certain types of evidence
should satisfy elements of § 1158(d)(6), while others should be held
ineligible as a matter of law. It also evaluates the case law applying
§ 1158(d)(6) and measures the case law's compatibility with a
heightened evidentiary standard.

I.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FILING ASYLUM
APPLICATIONS

Having a rudimentary understanding of the relevant legal framework
governing asylum proceedings is useful in comprehending the import of
on noncitizens who file fraudulent asylum applications. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= II 0_cong-bills&docid=f:s I348pcs.txt.pdf.
16. The Second Circuit has noted that frivolousness determinations are possible in a high volume
of cases. Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2006). And the Third Circuit has
highlighted the proclivity of certain immigration judges to find applications frivolous under 8
U.S.C. § II 58(d)(6). See Cham v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 690 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006)
("We cannot ignore the fact that Judge Ferlise typically finds asylum applications 'frivolous,' and
the BIA typically reverses that finding.").
17. 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
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frivolousness determinations. This Part outlines the contours of the
asylum application process, the statutory and regulatory structure
underlying findings of frivolousness, and the nascent case law
interpreting and applying § 1158(d)(6). Unlike the detailed legal
structure governing asylum, the standards governing frivolousness are
contained within a single sentence of statutory text and a paragraph in
the Code of Federal Regulations.'9 Therefore, the Board and federal
courts have had the responsibility of developing guidelines for the
consistent and fair application of the statutory provision.
Until April 2007, neither Congress, nor the Board, nor any federal
court had elucidated what evidentiary standards govern frivolousness
determinations. The Board recently specified that the government must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an alien knowingly
filed a fraudulent asylum application. 20 The federal courts have yet to
review the constitutionality of this standard. It appears that the
constitutional sufficiency of the preponderance standard for
frivolousness findings has not been raised by an asylum applicant on
appeal to date.
A.

Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Congress and the Board of Immigration Appeals have provided an
intricate burden-shifting framework for determining whether 2a
noncitizen alleging persecution within his home country merits asylum. 1
Because a person fleeing persecution is unlikely to possess tangible
22
proof of that persecution, an immigration judge's assessment of
18. For a detailed, yet concise, explanation of the legal framework of immigration control in the
United States, see TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), SYRACUSE UNIV.,
TRAC IMMIGRATION REPORT: THE ASYLUM PROCESS, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/159/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2007) [hereinafter TRAC ASYLUM PROCESS]. The TRAC website includes a
helpful diagram to illustrate the decision-making process for affirmative and defensive methods of
seeking asylum. Id. Other useful overviews of the asylum process include Chris Nwachukwu Okeke
& James A.R. Nafziger, United States Migration Law: Essentialsfor Comparison, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 531 (Supp. 2006); Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Removal-A Brief Overview of
the Substantive Law, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAw 2006, at 289 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 1535, 2006) (providing an overview of asylum law before the enactment of
the REAL ID Act).
19. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2007); id. § 1208.20.
20. In reY-L-, 24 1. &N. Dec. 151, 158 (B.I.A. 2007).
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13.
22. See Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Authentic refugees rarely are able
to offer direct corroboration of specific threats or specific incidents of persecution.").

Administrative "Death Sentence"
whether an immigrant qualifies as a "refugee" often depends on
subjective credibility determinations.2 3 Since 1996, if an immigration
judge believes that an alien has knowingly filed a fraudulent claim for
asylum, he can impose a permanent bar on that alien's receipt of future
immigration benefits, in addition to denying the instant claim for
refuge.24 Appellate courts review a denial of asylum and the factual
determinations underlying a frivolousness finding
for substantial
25
review.
of
standard
deferential
highly
a
evidence,
1. Asylum Application Process
Congress promulgated 8 U.S.C. § 1158, the portion of the United
States Code that governs grants of asylum, 26 as a means of fulfilling its
treaty obligations. In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 27 The Protocol
adopted certain articles of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.28 The United States thus is bound by that Convention,
including its requirement not to expel a person whose life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.29 In
23. See infra Parts I.A.I, II.C.2.
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2000); see also Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2007);
Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d 763 (1Ilth Cir. 2006); Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937
(8th Cir. 2006); Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2006); Chen v. Gonzales, 447
F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2006); Scheerer v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 1311 (11 th Cir. 2006); Alexandrov
v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2006); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 2005);
Selami v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005); Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582 (3d Cir.
2005); Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003); Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899 (5th Cir.
2002); Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334 (11 th Cir. 2001).
25. See Kifleyesus, 462 F.3d at 945; ignatova, 430 F.3d at 1214. But see Barreto-Claro,275 F.3d
at 1338 (applying a de novo standard of review); Scheerer, 445 F.3d at 1317 (same).
26. See 8 U.S.C. § l158(b)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (eligibility for asylum); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2000) (definition of refugee).
27. KELLY JEFFERYS, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2006
ANNUAL

FLOW

REPORT,

REFUGEES

AND

ASYLEES:

2005

2,

4

(2006),

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/RefugeeAsylee_5.pdf
(outlining
the
asylum and refugee process); see also Okeke & Nafziger, supra note 18, at 532-33.
28. See Okeke & Nafziger, supra note 18, at 532-33.
For the text of the Protocol, see Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (incorporating by reference the terms of the
Convention). The parties to the Protocol agreed to apply Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951
Convention. Id.
29. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, 11 (1951), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o-c-ref.htm.
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addition, "[t]he expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of
a decision reached in accordance with due process of law." 30 Congress
translated the requirements of the Convention into statutory law through
the Refugee
Act of 1980, which established a process for granting
31
asylum.

From 1980 to 2004, nearly 1.7 million individuals applied for asylum
from within the United States.32 Resident noncitizens may apply
affirmatively for asylum through a United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) asylum officer,33 or, if apprehended, may
apply defensively through an immigration judge as part of a removal
hearing.34 Immigration judges typically grant about twenty percent of
asylum applications: in fiscal year 2005, immigration judges received
50,753 asylum applications and granted asylum in 10,164 instances.3 5
More than forty percent of the individuals granted asylum were citizens
of China, Columbia, or Haiti,36 and nearly sixty percent were younger
30. Id. at art. 32.
31. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see JEFFERYS, supra note 27, at 4.
32. Migration
Policy
Institute,
Analyzing
Asylum
Applications,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/asylum.cfm (select "[t]otal number of asylum
applications submitted, by country of destination").
33. To apply for asylum through an USCIS asylum officer, the alien must file a Form 1-589-an
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal-within one year of the date she last
arrived in the United States. JEFFREYS, supra note 27, at 4. If the USCIS denies the application for
asylum, the applicant is referred to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for
removal proceedings. Id.
A noncitizen also may request asylum at a port of entry. Jeanne Batalova, Migration Policy
Institute, Spotlight on Refugees and Asylees in the United States (Aug. 2006),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?lD=415. An alien who requests asylum
in this manner usually is referred to the USCIS for a "credible fear" interview to determine whether
she is eligible to apply for asylum. Id.; see also JEFFREYS, supra note 27, at 4. If the USCIS
determines that the alien has a credible fear of returning to her country of origin, then it refers the
case to an immigration judge. Batalova, supra.
34. Batalova, supra note 33, at 2.
35. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION
COURTS
FY
2005
ASYLUM
STATISTICS
9
(2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY05AsyStats.pdf. In fiscal year 2004, immigration judges
received 59,609 asylum applications and granted asylum in 10,839 cases. EOIR, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION
COURTS
FY
2004
ASYLUM
STATISTICS
9
(2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY04AsyStats.pdf; see also Susan Kyle et al., StatisticalReport on
Immigration Court Proceedings, FY 2000-2004 in REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL, VOLUME
II: EXPERT REPORTS 383, 415-16 (2005), available at

http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/2005/february/immigrationCourtStats.pdf
(reporting on immigration court proceedings for fiscal years 2000 to 2004).
36. JEFFERYS, supra note 27, at 5. Specifically, 3008 asylees were from China, 1150 from
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than age thirty-five. 37 The few frivolousness findings that have been
reviewed by circuit courts were made in the context of removal
proceedings.
Immigration judges, who are trial-level adjudicators within the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) of the Department of
Justice, 38 preside over removal proceedings. 39 The Department of
Homeland Security assigns an attorney to represent the government's
interest. 40 The noncitizen has the privilege of representation by counsel
of his choosing at no expense to the government 41 and must be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present witnesses and evidence,42 examine
evidence against him, 43 cross-examine witnesses presented by the
government, 4 and receive assistance from an interpreter.4 5
Columbia, and 653 from Haiti. Id. (Table 8). In addition, 608 individuals were from Albania, 374
from Indonesia, 310 from India, 268 from Armenia, 264 from Ethiopia, 263 from Cameroon, and
257 from Guinea. Id. The 4582 additional asylees originated from various other countries. Id.
37. Id. (Table 9). Fifteen percent of asylees in 2005 were seventeen years or younger, thirteen
percent were between ages eighteen and twenty-four, and twenty-nine percent were between ages
twenty-five and thirty-four. Id. An additional twenty-seven percent of asylees were between ages
thirty-five and forty-four, while eleven percent were between ages forty-five and fifty-four. Id.
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2007). There are more than 200 immigration judges located in fiftythree immigration courts across the country. EOIR, FACT SHEET: FORMs OF RELIEF FROM
REMOVAL 1 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.htm [hereinafter FACT
SHEET].

39. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(I), (b)(1) (2000). Immigration judges may handle as many as 20,000
cases a year. Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing Burden,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at B2. In New York, judges schedule thirty to seventy cases at a time,
hold four contested hearings a day, and decide more than fifteen cases a week. Id. An unpublished
report in 2000 by a Justice Department evaluation team cautioned that New York judges were
"reaching the point of exhaustion and burnout." Id. In an April 2006 hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, John M. Walker, Jr., urged the
Committee to double the number of immigration judges and testified, "I fail to see how immigration
judges can be expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact and conclusions of law
under these circumstances." Id.
40. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2 (service counsel) (2007); see also id. § 100.2 (organization and functions);
id. § 1240.10(d) (removal hearing). In 2002, Congress abolished the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and transferred its functions to the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.
Code).
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.3; id. § 1240.10(a)(1), (2), (3).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4).
45. Noncitizens have a due process right to an accurate translation of removal proceedings. See,
e.g., Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000) ("It is long-settled that a competent
translation is fundamental to a full and fair hearing. If an alien does not speak English, deportation
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To establish that an individual should be removed, the government
must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 46 that the person is
not a citizen or national of the United States and that he is unlawfully
present in the United States.47 In most asylum cases, the alien concedes
that he is removable and requests asylum as a form of discretionary
relief.48 Therefore, in such cases, when an immigration judge denies an

application for asylum, the alien is removed on the basis of his
admission that he meets the statutory criteria for removal.
The asylum seeker bears the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that she qualifies as a "refugee," a person
who is unable or unwilling to return to her native country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion ("enumerated grounds").49 If an applicant establishes
past persecution, then a rebuttable presumption arises that she has a
well-founded fear of future persecution. 0 The government may rebut the
presumption by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that
conditions in the applicant's native country have changed such that she
no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution or that the applicant
could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the country. 5' If
proceedings must be translated into a language the alien understands. Moreover, an incorrect or
incomplete translation is the functional equivalent of no translation: the alien must be able to
understand the questions posed to him and to communicate his answers to the IJ." (internal citations
omitted)); Matter of Tomas, 19 1. & N. Dec. 464, 465-66 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that, where the
respondents cannot speak English fluently, the presence of a competent interpreter is essential for
their meaningful participation in certain phases of the hearing). Immigration regulations also call for
an accurate translation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.5 (2007) ("Any person acting as an interpreter in a
hearing before an immigration judge under this part shall be swom to interpret and translate
accurately, unless the interpreter is an employee of the United States Government, in which event
no such oath shall be required.").
46. Id. § 1240.8 (burden of proof); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (holding that the
government bears the burden of establishing by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that all
facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true before a resident alien may be deported).
47. See 8 U.S.C. § II 82(a)(6)(A)(i) (2000).
48. See FACT SHEET, supra note 38, at 2-3 (describing forms of discretionary relief from
removal, including grant of asylum).
49. See 8 U.S.C. § I158(b)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (eligibility for asylum); id.
§ I 158(b)(1)(B) (burden of proof); 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2000) (definition of refugee).
Though the statute does not specify a particular burden of proof, see 8 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B), the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that an alien must establish eligibility for asylum by a
preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211,215 (B.I.A. 1985).
50. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
51. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i), (ii).
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the government rebuts the presumption, the noncitizen is not barred from
a grant of asylum so long as she demonstrates compelling reasons for
being unwilling to return to her native country due to the severity of past
persecution or that there is a reasonable possibility that she may suffer
other serious harm upon removal.52
Alternatively, a noncitizen may qualify for asylum by demonstrating a
reasonable probability of future persecution on account of an
enumerated ground. 53 The Supreme Court has held that as little as a ten
percent chance of being "shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted" may
establish that an asylum applicant has a well-founded fear of future
persecution. 54 To demonstrate a well-founded fear, an asylum applicant
must establish that her fear of persecution is both subjectively genuine
and objectively reasonable. 55 An applicant does not have a well-founded
fear if she could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of her
home country. 56 The noncitizen must provide evidence of a reasonable
possibility that she would be singled out for persecution, unless she
establishes that (1) there is a pattern or practice in her country of
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to her on account of
an enumerated ground, and (2) she is included in, and identified with,
that group of persons.57
In determining whether an asylum applicant has met her burden of
proof, the immigration judge may weigh her credible testimony along

52. Id. § 1208.13(b)(l)(iii).
53. Id. § 1208.13(b)(2).
54. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). The Board of Immigration Appeals has
found that the following conditions must be met to establish a well-founded fear of future

persecution:
(1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by

means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could become aware,
that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of
punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien.
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N.
Dec. 211,212 (B.I.A. 1985)).
55. See, e.g., Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1998).
56. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). If the persecutor is a government or is government-sponsored, or
if the applicant has established past persecution, the immigration judge must presume that internal
relocation would not be reasonable, unless the government establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate. Id. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii). If the
applicant has not established past persecution, then she bears the burden of establishing that it

would not be reasonable for her to relocate, unless the persecution is by a government or is
government-sponsored. Id. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i).
57. Id. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).
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with other evidence of record. 58 Recognizing that a person fleeing
persecution is unlikely to possess documents establishing that
persecution, 59 asylum regulations provide that the testimony of an
asylum applicant may suffice to sustain her burden of proof without
corroboration, "but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that
[her] testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts
sufficient to demonstrate that [she] is a refugee. 6 °
An immigration judge may find an asylum applicant's testimony not
to be credible. Such an adverse credibility finding may be based
on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant ....
the inherent plausibility of the applicant's ... account, the

consistency between the applicant's ...written and oral
statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and
considering the circumstances under which the statements were
made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the
consistency of such statements with other evidence of
record..., and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such
statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's
claim, or any other relevant factor.61
An adverse credibility determination must be supported by a specific,
cogent reason in the record and cannot be based on speculation.62 The
reason supplied by the immigration judge "must be substantial and must

58. 8 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
59. See Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has explained that
requiring corroboration would be unreasonable in light of the circumstances of refugees:
We recognize that omitting a corroboration requirement may invite those whose lives or
freedom are not threatened to manufacture evidence of specific danger. But the imposition of
such a requirement would result in the deportation of many people whose lives genuinely are in
jeopardy. Authentic refugees rarely are able to offer direct corroboration of specific threats. It
is difficult to imagine what other forms of testimony the petitioners could present other than
their own statements. Persecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits
attesting to their acts of persecution.
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal alteration, quotation, and
citations omitted).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a).
61. 8 U.S.C. § I 158(b)(1)(B)(iii). This standard was promulgated in the REAL ID Act of 2005,
and applies to all asylum applications filed on or after May 11, 2005. See REAL ID Act of 2005
§ 101(h)(2) Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
62. See Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994); Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955
F.2d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 1992) ("An [immigration judge]'s credibility findings are given
substantial deference by the reviewing court, but must be supported by a 'specific, cogent reason'
for the disbelief." (quoting Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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bear a legitimate nexus to the finding., 63 Minor inconsistencies that do
not relate to the basis of the asylum applicant's fear of persecution or go
to the heart of her asylum claim are insufficient to support an adverse
credibility finding.64 So long as one of the grounds identified by the
immigration judge as the basis for an adverse credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must accept it.65
The immigration court must provide an asylum applicant with a
reasonable opportunity to explain any perceived inconsistencies that
form the basis of a denial of asylum.6 6 An adverse credibility finding
typically is fatal to a noncitizen's application for relief from removal.
2.

Sanctionfor Filinga Frivolous Asylum Application

In this statutory and regulatory context, Congress added a sanction for
the filing of a frivolous asylum application. Section 1158(d)(6) of Title 8
of the United States Code provides:
If the Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly
made a frivolous application for asylum and the alien has
received the notice under paragraph (4)(A), the alien shall be
permanently ineligible for any benefits under this chapter,
effective as of the date of a final determination on such
application.67
Accompanying regulations specify that "an asylum application ' is
68
frivolous if any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated.
Before an immigration judge may make a frivolousness finding, he must
provide the asylum applicant with "sufficient opportunity
to account for
69
any discrepancies or implausible aspects of [his] claim.,
63. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990).
64. See Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003).
65. See Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250,
1259 (9th Cir. 2003)) (affirming a negative credibility finding even though some factors were

factually unsupported or irrelevant).
66. Chen v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing a negative credibility finding
in part because the alien was denied a reasonable opportunity to explain a perceived inconsistency);
Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 173d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing a negative credibility finding
because the alien was denied a reasonable opportunity to explain a perceived inconsistency).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2000). Section 1158(d)(4)(A) states that, at the time of filing an
application for asylum, the Attorney General shall "advise the alien of the privilege of being
represented by counsel and of the consequences ... of knowingly filing a frivolous application for
asylum ....
Id. § 1158(d)(4)(A).
68. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2007); see also id. § 1208.20.
69. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20; see also id. § 1208.20.
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Neither the statute nor its implementing regulations provide which
party bears the burden of proof or what evidentiary standard that party
must satisfy to support a frivolousness finding under § 11 58(d)(6).7 ° The

statutory and regulatory framework suggests that five elements must be
established: 7' a noncitizen must have (1) deliberately (2) fabricated (3) a
material element of his asylum application, and he must have received
(4) a sufficient opportunity to address the perceived problems with his
claim for asylum and (5) notice of the consequences of a finding under
§ 1158(d)(6). 72 A frivolousness finding, which may be made upon the
government's motion, may also be made sua sponte by an immigration
judge.73 In each of the federal cases reviewing frivolousness findings,

the immigration judge had determined that the alien was not a credible
74
witness and had made an explicit adverse credibility finding.

70. The Supreme Court held that, when a statute does not include a specific burden of proof for
an adjudicatory proceeding, courts must look to § 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1981). Section 7(c) provides that "[a] sanction may not be
imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof
cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000). The Supreme Court concluded that § 7(c) of the APA "was
intended to establish a standard of proof and that the standard adopted is the traditional
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard." Steadman, 450 U.S. at 102.
However, Congress deliberately excluded deportation proceedings from the APA. See Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306-10 (1955) (holding that deportation proceedings are governed solely
and exclusively by regulations promulgated under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, although
the APA served as a model for such regulations); accord Hashim v. INS, 936 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir.
1991); Escobar v. INS, 935 F.2d 650, 651 (4th Cir. 1991). But see Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d
1020, 1023-25 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that exclusion and deportation proceedings are
"adversary adjudications" within the meaning of the APA).
71. See Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (listing three elements
of a frivolousness finding).
72. See id. This Article focuses on the three elements of intent, fabrication, and materiality. It
does not address the fourth element that requires an immigration judge to provide the alien with an
opportunity to address the inconsistencies that underlie a frivolousness finding. See Farah v.
Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an alien must be provided an
opportunity to account for all discrepancies before an immigration judge may impose a finding
under § 1158(d)(6)). Nor does this Article address the additional requirement of 8 U.S.C.
§ II 58(d)(6) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 that the alien be provided notice of the consequences of a
frivolousness finding.
73. See In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 160 (B.I.A. 2007).
74. See Luciana v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., No. 05-3544, 2007 WL 2696865, at *6 (3d Cir. Sept.
17, 2007) (framing the mixed credibility finding as hypothetical, since the asylum application was
time-barred); Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 271-74 (2d Cir. 2007); Aziz v. Gonzales, 478
F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2007); Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d 763, 767 (11 th Cir. 2006);
Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2006); Liu, 455 F.3d at 109; Chen v. Gonzales,
447 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2006); Scheerer v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir.
2006); Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 403 (6th Cir. 2006); Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d
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A finding that a noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous asylum
application imposes a permanent bar on the receipt of any future
immigration benefits. 75 Typically, if a noncitizen is denied asylum, she
may be eligible to apply for other forms of relief at the removal
hearing,76 such as voluntary departure, 77 cancellation of removal,78 or

adjustment of status.79 In addition, a removed noncitizen may later apply
for asylum 80 or other immigration benefits. 8 1 But, once a finding of
273, 275-78 (6th Cir. 2006); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209, 1212 (8th Cir. 2005); Selami v.
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 621, 622, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2005); Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 589 (3d
Cir. 2005); Farah, 348 F.3d at 1156; Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 2002); BarretoClaro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1337 (lth Cir. 2001); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(I)(B)(iii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (credibility determination).
75. The alien may still be eligible for withholding of removal or similar temporary protections
where a deportation would result in dire persecutions. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2007) ("For purposes of
this section, a finding that an alien filed a frivolous asylum application shall not preclude the alien
from seeking withholding of removal."). To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an
applicant must meet a more stringent standard of proof than for asylum. Fedunyak v. Gonzales, 477
F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655 (9th Cir. 2000)). An
applicant may qualify for withholding in two ways. First, the applicant may prove past persecution
on the basis of an enumerated ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). Second, the applicant may
demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted" upon removal.
Id. § 1208.16(b)(2). A finding of frivolousness precludes all other forms of immigration relief. See 8
U.S.C. § 158(d)(6) (2000).
76. See FACT SHEET, supra note 38, at 1-4 (describing forms of discretionary, administrative, and
judicial relief from removal).
77. Voluntary departure is the most common form of relief from removal. Id. at 1. Voluntary
departure allows an otherwise removable noncitizen to depart the United States at her expense. Id. at
1-2; 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2000). Aliens granted voluntary departure must depart within the time
specified by the immigration judge, which is usually 120 days if granted voluntary departure prior
to the completion of removal proceedings, see id. § 1229c(a)(2)(A), or sixty days if granted relief at
the conclusion of the proceedings. See id. § 1229c(b)(2); FACT SHEET, supra note 38, at 2.
78. Cancellation of removal may be granted if an alien (I) has been physically and continuously
present in the United States for at least ten years, (2) has been a person of good moral character
during such period, (3) has not been convicted of certain offenses, and (4) demonstrates that
removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her immediate family
members who are either United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(l) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); FACT SHEET, supra note 38, at 1-2.
79. An alien may apply to an immigration judge to change his status from a non-immigrant to a
lawful permanent resident through adjustment of status, if he satisfies certain conditions. See 8
U.S.C. § 1255(i), (j) (2000). In particular, the alien must be admissible for permanent residence, and
an immigrant visa must be immediately available at the time of application. Id. Spouses (or other
family members) or employers may petition for an alien's adjustment of status. See id.; FACT
SHEET, supra note 38, at 3.
80. An alien who previously has been denied asylum may not apply for asylum in the future
unless she demonstrates the existence of changed circumstances that materially affect her eligibility
for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2000).
81. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(A), (B)(i)(ll) (providing that an alien who has been removed may not
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frivolousness has become final, the noncitizen is ineligible for any relief
from removal or for other
immigration benefits, during the removal
82
process or in the future.
3.

Appellate Procedures

Once an immigration judge has found that a noncitizen knowingly
filed a frivolous asylum application under § 1158(d)(6), the alien may
appeal that finding to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 83 Like
immigration judges, the Board is a part of the EOIR.8 4 Under governing
regulations, "[flacts determined by the immigration judge, including
findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to
determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly
erroneous.' ' 85 The Board reviews questions of law, discretion, and
judgment de novo. 8 6 It may dismiss or sustain an appeal, remand the case
to the immigration judge, or, in rare cases, refer the case to the Attorney
General for a decision.8 7 Precedent of the Board is binding on
immigration judges and the Department of Homeland Security unless the
Attorney General modifies the Board's decision.88
In addition to serving an appellate function, the Board also comprises
the highest administrative body with the authority to interpret
immigration law. 89 The Board is charged with providing guidance to the
Department of Homeland Security, immigration judges, and the general
public on the proper application of immigration statutes. 90 It also has the
obligation to fill any statutory gaps. 9 1 From the effective date of 8 U.S.C.
apply for certain benefits within five or ten years of removal, depending on certain conditions); id.
§ 11 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(1) (providing that an alien who voluntarily departs may reapply for benefits after
three years).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2000).
83. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2007) (appeals to Board of Immigration Appeals); id. § 1240.15
(same); see id. § 1003.1 (b)(3), (9) (appellate jurisdiction of Board of Immigration Appeals over
orders of removal and asylum decisions).
84. See id. § 1003.1 (a)(1). The Board is comprised of fifteen members. Id. § 1003.1 (a)(1).
85. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
86. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
87. FACT SHEET, supra note 38, at 3.
88. Id. at 3-4.
89. Id. at 3.
90. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(1).
91. Deference to the Board's reasonable interpretation of an immigration statute is mandated by
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). See
also Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007)
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§ 1158(d)(6) in 1996 until late April 2007, the Board summarily
affirmed or denied, without elucidation, the few findings of frivolous
asylum applications that were challenged on appeal.9 2
When the Board affirms a frivolousness finding, the asylum seeker
can appeal the decision to the federal court of appeals for the judicial
circuit in which the immigration judge presided.9 3 The Immigration and
Nationality Act defines the scope and standard of an appellate court's
review of a removal order. The statute provides:
(A) the court of appeals shall decide the petition only on the
administrative record on which the order of removal is based,
(B) the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary,
(C) a decision that an alien is not eligible for admission to the
United States is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law,
and
(D) the Attorney General's discretionary judgment whether to
grant relief under section 1158(a) of this title [providing for
asylum] shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the
law and an abuse of discretion.94
(explaining problems with Chevron deference and advocating for its recasting as a judicial voting
rule, which would make agency deference an aggregate property that arises from a set of votes,
rather than an internal component of the decision rules used by individual judges); See generally
Patrick M. Gany, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship between the
Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921 (2006) (arguing that the evolution of
the nondelegation doctrine essentially necessitates the Chevron doctrine).
92. The Board first clarified the evidentiary standards that govern frivolousness findings on April
25, 2007. See In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151 (B.I.A. 2007). Before that time, the Board had
provided no guidance to assist immigration judges or federal courts. See Liu v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d 763, 767,
769 (lth Cir. 2006); Chen v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2006); Alexandrov v.
Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 397 (6th Cir. 2006); Muhanna v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 582, 587 (3d Cir.
2005).
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2000) (venue); see also id. § 1252(a)(1) (providing judicial review
from final orders of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (not precluding
judicial review from denial of asylum); id. § 1252(a)(5) ("[A] petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means
for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this
chapter ....).
94. Id. § 1252(b)(4). These provisions apply unless the noncitizen claims to be a national of the
United States and the court of appeals finds that a genuine issue of material fact about the alien's
nationality is presented. In that case, the court will transfer the proceeding to the district court for
the judicial district in which the noncitizen resides for a new hearing on the nationality claim. Id.
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Appellate courts also review adverse credibility determinations under a
highly deferential standard, known as the substantial evidence
standard. 95 Like other factual findings, adverse credibility determinations
"are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary. 96
In sum, while Congress and executive agencies have issued detailed
guidelines for granting asylum, the legislative and executive branches
have provided only a skeletal framework for frivolousness findings
under § 1158(d)(6). The statutory and regulatory structure invites
immigration judges to exercise wide discretion in denying immigration
relief and barring the future receipt of immigration benefits. While
Congress has made clear that federal appellate courts may only review
immigration judges' factual findings under a substantial evidence
standard, these courts still play an important role in reviewing
immigration judges' decisions and fleshing out the contours of the legal
requirements under § 11 58(d)(6).
B.

JudicialFrameworkfor Application of§ 1158(d)(6)

Prior to the Board's pronouncement in April 2007 of the applicable
burden of proof,97 federal courts of appeals had reviewed fourteen cases
involving findings that a noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous asylum
application under § 1158(d)(6). 98 Four circuits had vacated frivolousness

§ 1252(b)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) (2000).
95. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see, e.g., Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2007) ("We
review the [immigration judge's] factual findings under the substantial evidence standard-the
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary. When a factual challenge pertains to a credibility finding[,] we afford particular
deference in applying the substantial evidence standard, mindful that the law must entrust some
official with responsibility to hear an applicant's asylum claim, and the [immigration judge] has the
unique advantage among all officials involved in the process of having heard directly from the
applicant.") (internal quotations omitted); Mamana v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2006)
("[A]n [immigration judge]'s adverse credibility findings 'are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary."') (citing Turay v. Ashcroft, 405 F.3d
663, 668 (8th Cir. 2005)); Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2004).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
97. See In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 157.
98. See Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2007); Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d
763 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2006); Liu v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 455 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2006); Chen v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2006); Scheerer v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 1311 (11 th Cir. 2006); Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395 (6th Cir.
2006); Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273 (6th Cir. 2006); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209 (8th
Cir. 2005); Selami v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005); Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582
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findings, 99 and four circuits had upheld them. 00 The circuit courts'
decisions reflect their recognition that § 1158(d)(6) carries severe
consequences for asylum seekers and warrants careful review to ensure
fair and reliable application. Courts have characterized a finding under
§ 1158(d)(6) as a "death sentence"' 0 '-not only because it permanently
forecloses any administrative remedies from removal but also because, if
imposed erroneously, it could potentially result in a loss of life. Section
1158(d)(6) constitutes "one of the most extreme provisions" in the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
in that "the bar2 once imposed may not be waived under any
10
circumstances."'
Courts have recognized that asylum seekers possess procedural due
process rights in the context of § 1158(d)(6).103 The Second Circuit has
gone so far as to opine (but not to hold) that
[r]equiring a more comprehensive opportunity to be heard in the
frivolousness context makes sense in light of what is at stake in
a frivolousness decision, for both the alien and the
government.... [W]hat qualifies as a "sufficient opportunity"
for the purposes of satisfying the agency regulations governing
frivolousness findings would, we would think, have to be more
ample than 0what
suffices in the ordinary course of asylum
4
proceedings.1
No court, however, has held that the application of § 1158(d)(6) in the
absence of a specified burden of proof violated noncitizens' due process
rights. Indeed, no opinion indicates that the parties raised this argument
or called the court's attention10 to
the lack of evidentiary standards
5
governing the initial factfinding.

(3d Cir. 2005); Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003); Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899 (5th
Cir. 2002); Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2001).
99. See Mingkid, 468 F.3d 763; Chen, 447 F.3d 468; Scheerer, 445 F.3d 1311; Alexandrov, 442
F.3d 395; Muhanna, 399 F.3d 582; Farah,348 F.3d 1153.
100. See Kifleyesus, 462 F.3d 937; Sterkaj, 439 F.3d 273; Ignatova, 430 F.3d 1209; Selami, 423
F.3d 621; Efe, 293 F.3d 899; Barreto-Claro,275 F.3d 1334.
101. See Alexandrov, 442 F.3d at 397 n.1; Muhanna, 399 F.3d at 588.
102. Muhanna, 399 F.3d at 588 (quoting AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL, IMMIGRATION

LEGISLATION HANDBOOK § 8:96 (database updated April 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. See Liu, 455 F.3d at 114 n.3; Alexandrov, 442 F.3d at 404-05, 407; Muhanna, 399 F.3d at
589.
104. Liu, 455 F.3d at 114 n.3 (citations omitted).
105. The one possible exception is the Second Circuit's decision in Liu. See id. at 113. The court
noted that "we have no binding circuit law on, inter alia, who carries the burden of proof, what

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:831, 2007

Lacking guidance from the Board of Immigration Appeals, courts
were forced to generate standards in the first instance to guide their
review. 106 Some appellate courts opined on the standard of review
07
applicable to an immigration judge's frivolousness determination,1
how definitive the evidence of fabrication must be, 0 8 how
"deliberate" 10 9 and "material" 11 a fabrication must be, and what
constitutes a "sufficient opportunity" to address perceived problems with
an asylum claim.'1 ' Several themes can be gleaned from these cases.
First, several courts interpreted the regulations implementing
§ 1158(d)(6) to require demonstrable proof of intentional fraud." 2 The
decisions affirming frivolousness findings involved tangible evidence of
fabrication, such-as forged documents offered in support of the asylum
seeker's claim of persecution 13 or an admission of falsehood. 1 4 Two
cases vacated § 1158(d)(6) findings because the fraud was not supported

degree of certainty is required, when an opportunity to be heard will be deemed sufficient, how
'deliberate' and 'material' a fabrication must be, and what deference the [Board] owes to an
[immigration judge]'s finding in this context." Id.
106. See id. at 113-15 (surveying circuit court cases involving frivolousness determinations
decided before July 2006).
107. See Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937, 945 (8th Cir. 2006) (substantial evidence);
Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 2005) (substantial evidence); Barreto-Claro v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1338-39 (11 th Cir. 2001) (de novo).
108. See Liu, 455 F.3d at 114-15 (reviewing case law and suggesting that "concrete and
conclusive evidence of fabrication is needed to warrant a ruling that renders an alien permanently
ineligible for immigration benefits in the United States").
109. See Kifleyesus, 462 F.3d at 943, 945 (finding that, because the record did not compel an
interpretation of petitioner's state of mind contrary to that adopted by the Board, the Board's finding
that petitioner's fabrications were intentional sufficed to satisfy the "deliberateness" element of 8
C.F.R. § 208.20).
110. See Chen v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 468, 474-76 (6th Cir. 2006) (dismissing "inconsistencies"
in asylum applications as "of only background interest" and as not "germane to the crucial issue in
this case").
111. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an asylum
applicant must be afforded an opportunity to address all evidence of fabrication on which a
frivolousness finding is based).
112. See Liu, 455 F.3d at 114-15; Scheerer v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir.
2006) ("Because the consequences of a finding of frivolousness are so severe ...[t]he [immigration
judge] must first find material aspects of the alien's asylum application were demonstrably false and
such fabrications were knowingly and deliberately made.")
113. See Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 854, 856 & nn.1-2 (8th Cir 2007); Ignatova v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 2005); Selami v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 621,624, 626 (6th Cir. 2005).
114. See Aziz, 478 F.3d at 856; Kifleyesus, 462 F.3d at 940; Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275
F.3d 1334, 1336-37 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
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by substantial evidence." 5 After reviewing a subset of these cases, the
Second Circuit posited that "arguably" the decisions could be read as
suggesting that "concrete and conclusive evidence of fabrication is
needed" to support a finding of frivolousness.' 16 At least one decision,
however, indicated that "concrete and conclusive evidence of
fabrication"'' 7 is not requisite to a finding under § 1158(d)(6), but that
inconsistencies between an applicant's testimony and asylum application
may suffice." 18
Second, two circuits have held that an adverse credibility
determination, standing alone, cannot support a finding of
frivolousness." 19 In Muhanna v. Gonzales,2 0 the Third Circuit held that
under 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 a finding of frivolousness does not flow
credibility
adverse
an
from
automatically
determination ....Inconsistencies between testimony and an
asylum application, while certainly relevant to a credibility
determination that may result in the denial of an applicant's
asylum claim, do not equate to a frivolousness finding under
Section 1158(d)(6), which carries with it much greater
consequences.121
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Third Circuit in adopting this
However, not all courts have examined separately the
holding.
inconsistencies underlying an adverse credibility determination and
those supporting a frivolousness finding. The only opinion to affirm a

115. See Chen, 447 F.3d at 476; Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 408-09 (6th Cir. 2006).
116. Liu, 455 F.3d at 114 (citing Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 902 n.l (5th Cir. 2002));
Ignatova, 430 F.3d at 1214; Selami, 423 F.3d at 624, 626; Barreto-Claro, 275 F.3d at 1339). The
court concluded, "Looking at both those cases that have affirmed findings of frivolousness and
those that have vacated them, it would not be unreasonable to conjecture that federal courts seem to
require a heightened evidentiary standard in evaluating frivolousness." Liu, 455 F.3d at 115. The
court did not opine as to what that "heightened evidentiary standard" should be to satisfy due

process. Id.
117. Liu, 455 F.3d at 114.
118. See Efe, 293 F.3d at 908 ("We affirm the determination that Efe filed a frivolous application

for asylum. Efe has gone back and forth with the facts and misrepresented his case several times. He
has also failed to take advantage of ample opportunity to clarify his contradictory testimony.").
119. See Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d 763, 770 (11th Cir. 2006); Scheerer v. U.S. Att'y
Gen., 445 F.3d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006); Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir.

2005).
120. 399 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2005).

121. Id. at 589.
122. See Scheerer, 445 F.3d at 1318.
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23
frivolousness finding based primarily on testimonial inconsistencies
failed to differentiate between the two bodies of evidence. 24
Finally, the circuits have reached different conclusions as to the
proper standard of review for evaluating findings under § 1 158(d)(6).
Recognizing that an immigration judge's finding must satisfy statutory
requirements, the Eleventh Circuit has applied a de novo standard of
review.125 The court's review is not without deference, but is tempered
with deference to the immigration judge in accordance with Chevron's
mandate that an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statutory
provision it is charged with administering must stand. 2 6 On the other
hand, the Eighth Circuit1 27 and, to some degree, the Ninth Circuit 128 have
held that the substantial evidence standard129 governs their review of an
immigration judge's findings of inconsistencies, implausibilities, and
demeanor underlying a frivolousness determination.
In sum, the fourteen cases that reviewed frivolousness findings before
April 2007 failed to produce a consistent or comprehensive body of case
law to guide review of immigration judges' findings under § 11 58(d)(6).
These cases did not acknowledge that neither Congress nor the Board of

123. See Efe, 293 F.3d at 908; cf Chen v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (vacating
the finding of frivolousness after rejecting inconsistencies and indicia of implausibility identified by
the immigration judge because they were unsupported by substantial evidence, but not suggesting
that, if these inconsistencies and implausibilities had been valid, they would have been insufficient
as a matter of law to support a frivolousness determination); Mingkid, 468 F.3d at 769-70 (vacating
a frivolousness finding because the immigration judge failed to find that the petitioner deliberately
fabricated a material element of his asylum application, but not criticizing the fact that the
frivolousness finding was based solely on inconsistencies in the petitioner's testimony).
124. See Efe, 293 F.3d 899. The court repeatedly alluded to the great deference accorded to an
immigration judge's credibility determinations and declared that it "cannot replace the Board or
[immigration judge]'s determinations concerning witness credibility or ultimate factual findings
based on credibility determinations with its own determinations." Id. at 905.
125. See Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1134, 1335, 1338 (1 lth Cir 2001); Scheerer,
445 F.3d at 1317.
126. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). In
Barreto-Claro,the Eleventh Circuit explained that, under de novo review, "we give due deference
to the Board's strict, no tolerance statutory interpretation, that applicants must tell the truth or be
removed. This policy best supports the statute's underlying purpose, as implemented by the
regulations, of discouraging frivolous applications." 275 F.3d at 1339.
127. See Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2007); Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d
937, 945 (8th Cir. 2006); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 2005).
128. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156-58 (9th Cir. 2003) (implying, though not
explicitly stating, that an appellate court must review an immigration judge's findings of
inconsistencies identified as the basis of a frivolousness determination for substantial evidence).
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000).
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Immigration Appeals had specified which party bears the burden of
proof or what degree of certainty is required to support a finding that a
noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. In April
2007, the Board filled some of the statutory gaps. However, the legal
framework developed by the Board and the courts to date is wholly
inadequate to protect asylum seekers' fundamental liberty interests.
C.

Board of Appeals' Pronouncementon Applicable Burden of Proof

From 1996 until April 2007, the Board provided no standards for
applying or reviewing an immigration judge's application of
§ 1158(d)(6). In July 2006, the Second Circuit, frustrated by the Board's

reticence to clarify this important area of the law, remanded a case
involving a frivolousness finding and ordered the Board to "set down
clear and explicit standards by which frivolousness decisions may be
judged., 130 On April 25, 2007, the Board responded by issuing its
decision in In re Y-L-.13 1 There, the Board held that the government must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an asylum applicant
132
knowingly and deliberately fabricated material elements of his claim.
The Board extrapolated the appropriate burden from existing
regulatory standards. 33 It noted that regulations provide that an
applicant for relief from removal carries the burden of demonstrating
that he meets all requirements for eligibility.1 34 Regulations also require
that, "[i]f the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for
130. See Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2006). The court encouraged the
Board to consider not only the relevant statutes and regulations, but also the principles articulated
by federal circuit courts. Id. As justification for its remand, the Second Circuit stressed
considerations of national uniformity and statutory ambiguity. Id. at 116-17. The court stated:
In the frivolousness context, uniformity is not just uniquely possible, but is also of unusual
importance. Since none of the circuit courts have, as yet, produced a substantial body of law
with respect to frivolousness, there is a real opportunity for the [Board] to take the lead in the
establishment of uniform national standards for deciding when a finding of frivolousness is
appropriate. It is, of course, desirable for all asylum petitions to be handled in a consistent
manner by the various circuits. But, the grave consequences of a frivolousness finding amplify
the importance of ensuring that an applicant's eligibility for asylum benefits in this country
does not depend on the circuit that, by fortune or fate, reviewed the case.
Id. The court also cited language from § 1158(d) and the corresponding regulation that "arguably
requires interpretation and clarification." Id. at I 17.
131. See In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151 (B.l.A. 2007).
132. Id. at 157.
133. Seeid.
134. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2006) (providing that the alien shall have "the burden of
establishing that he or she is eligible for any requested benefit or privilege and that it should be
granted in the exercise of discretion")).
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mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the alien shall
have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such
grounds do not apply." 135 The Board acknowledged that this regulation
does not apply to § 1158(d)(6), however, because a finding of
frivolousness is not a ground for mandatory denial of asylum. 136 Rather,
it "is a preemptive determination which, once made, forever bars an
alien from any benefit under the Act."'' 37 After this discussion of
selective regulatory principles, the Board without further analysis held
that, "[b]ecause of the severe consequences that flow from a
frivolousness finding, the preponderance of the evidence must support
an Immigration Judge's finding that the respondent knowingly and
' 138
deliberately fabricated material elements of the claim."
The Board dismissed the Second Circuit's suggestion that "concrete
and conclusive evidence of fabrication" is required to support a finding
of frivolousness. 139 Further, the Board declined to follow the court's
instruction that it analyze the federal case law applying § 1158(d)(6) in
determining the applicable burden of proof. Instead, the Board
summarily rejected the Second Circuit's proposed burden by noting that
it "find[s] no indication in the statute or regulation that a frivolousness
finding must be supported by 'concrete or conclusive' evidence of
140
fabrication."'
Three fundamental flaws permeate the Board's analysis of what
burden of proof must attend determinations under § 1 158(d)(6). First, the
Board failed to recognize that the burden of proof must comport with
asylum seekers' due process rights and neglected to conduct an analysis
of what burden is compelled by the Due Process Clause.' 41 Second, the
Board neither squared its proposed burden with the Supreme Court's
mandate that the government establish elements of removal by clear and
convincing evidence, 42 nor explored the implications of this mandate

135. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d)).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20).

139. Id. at 158.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 157-59.
142. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (holding that the government bears the

burden of establishing by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that all facts alleged as
grounds for deportation are true before a resident alien may be deported).
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for what effectively amounts to a permanent order of removal.1 43 Third,
the Board failed to recognize that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a), 14 4 which
specifies that the government must establish an alien's removability by
clear and convincing evidence, provides a more relevant regulatory
145
template for frivolousness determinations than does § 1240.8(d),
which governs relief from removal and mandatory grounds for denial of
relief.1 46 The Board offered no rationale for treating a frivolousness
1 47
finding as anything other than a permanent order of removal.
The Board's holding that an immigration judge may make a finding
under § 1158(d)(6)-and permanently deprive the asylum seeker of all
current and future forms of immigration relief-upon a preponderance
of the evidence violates principles of due process. 48 As of the date of
this article, no federal court has analyzed the constitutionality of this
burden of proof in the context of a frivolous finding.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCY OF THE
PREPONDERANCE STANDARD FOR FINDINGS UNDER
§ 1158(d)(6)

The Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from "depriv[ing
149
any person] of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'
For over a century, it has been settled that all aliens within the United
5
States-regardless of the lawfulness or duration of their presence
15
1
process:
due
are "persons" entitled to the protection of procedural
143. See In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 157-59.
144. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (providing that an alien "shall be found to be removable if the
[government] proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as
charged").
145. Id. § 1240.8(d) (providing that an alien "shall have the burden of establishing that he or she
is eligible for any requested benefit or privilege and that it should be granted in the exercise of
discretion"); id. ("If the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of
the application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.").
146. See In re Y-L-, 24 1.& N. Dec. at 157-59.
147. See id.
148. See infra Part I1.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
150. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that certain
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens
outside of our geographic borders. But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." (citations
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There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects every one of these persons from
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional
protection. 152

After entrance, aliens have a protected liberty interest in their right to be
and remain in the United States,1 53 and the Fifth Amendment entitles
resident noncitizens to procedural due process in removal
proceedings. 154 One component of procedural due process is that no
removal order may issue unless the government proves the facts alleged
as grounds for removal by clear and convincing evidence. 55 To
determine the level of procedural due process that must attend

omitted)); cf Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("[A]liens who
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.").
151. See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903)
(holding that aliens in deportation proceedings are entitled to procedural due process); Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that aliens are "persons" with respect to the
Fifth Amendment); see generally Brian L. Rooney, Note, Administrative Notice, Due Process, and
the Adjudication of Asylum Claims in the United States, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 955, 976-77
(1994) (discussing the scope of aliens' due process rights); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal
Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 862-68 (1989) (analyzing the
source and extent of Congress's power to regulate immigration).
152. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
153. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) ("A deportation hearing involves
issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens
may be returned, perhaps to life itself."); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("Here the
liberty of an individual is at stake .... Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding,
it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in
this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious one-cannot be
doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that
liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness."); Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150,
1161 (9th Cir. 2004) ("An alien facing deportation confronts the loss of a significant liberty interest,
as deportation 'visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live
and work in this land of freedom."' (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154)).
154. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) ("It is well established that the Fifth Amendment
entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings." (citing Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100101)).
155. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). The Court did not frame its holding that
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence must support a removal order as a product of due
process. However, its decision was heavily guided by due process norms. See Hiroshi Motomura,
The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: ProceduralSurrogatesfor Substantive Constitutional
Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1645 (1992).
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frivolousness findings, including the applicable burden of proof, courts
must apply the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge.
A.

The ProtectedInterest Implicated by a Finding of Frivolousness

Before a court applies the Mathews test, an individual must establish
that the proceeding or sanction at issue deprives him of an interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. 156 Essentially, a finding of
frivolousness operates as a permanent order of removal. 5 When a
§ 1158(d)(6) finding is made within the context of a removal proceeding,
the asylum seeker immediately becomes ineligible to seek relief from
158
removal, both within the context of the hearing and forever thereafter.
Therefore, the same protected interest at stake in a removal
proceeding-a resident alien's right to be and remain in the United
States-is threatened by a finding under § 158(d)(6). Indeed, because a
frivolousness finding imposes a more severe sanction than a one-time
removal, proceedings in which a frivolousness determination may issue
59
should provide heightened safeguards to satisfy due process concerns.1
In addition, asylum seekers are entitled to an adjudication of their
claims that is consistent with due process. 60 The Supreme Court has
156. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) ("Procedural due process imposes
constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.").
157. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2000); Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 117 (2d Cir.
2006) ("A finding of frivolousness is a potential 'death sentence' for an alien's immigration
prospects.").
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6); Luciana v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., No. 05-3544, 2007 WL
2696865, at *11 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2007) ("By additionally issuing a frivolousness finding, the IJ
brought down on Petitioner a lifetime ban on all means of legally entering the United States."). The
alien may still be eligible for withholding of removal or similar temporary protections where a
deportation would result in dire persecutions. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2007) ("For purposes of this
section, a finding that an alien filed a frivolous asylum application shall not preclude the alien from
seeking withholding of removal.").
159. See Martinez-de Bojorquez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2004) ("As to the first
Mathews factor, we have previously noted that 'the private liberty interests involved in deportation
proceedings are among the most substantial."' (quoting Padilla-Agustin v. INS, 21 F.3d 970, 974
(9th Cir. 1994)).
160. See Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 321 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that, while an illegal
immigrant has no legally protected liberty interest in remaining in the United States, "an illegal
alien possesses an identifiable liberty interest in being accorded 'all opportunity to be heard upon
the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States' before being deported,"
which "remains a cognizable interest within the Mathews v. Eldridge framework" (citation
omitted)); Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1146 (11th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that
"[n]umerous courts have recognized" that the Due Process Clause protects an alien's liberty interest
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found that the executive branch must enforce immigration policies in
accordance with the procedural safeguards of due process.

16

1

Courts

assume that, when Congress directs an agency to establish a procedure,
Congress intends that procedure to be fair. 162 Because frivolousness
findings necessarily involve assessment of the validity of noncitizens'
claims for asylum, courts' holdings that asylum adjudications must
comport with due process apply with equal force to frivolousness
determinations. As the Third Circuit has held, "Congress instructed the
Attorney General to establish an asylum procedure, and United States'
treaty obligations and fairness mandate that the asylum procedure
promulgated
by the Attorney General provide the most basic of due
process."'163 Allowing an immigration judge to find that an alien
knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application upon a preponderance of
the evidence offends basic principles of fundamental fairness and
violates noncitizens' due process rights.

in the "fundamental fairness" of a deportation proceeding (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Chain v.
Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 690-91 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an asylum applicant
should expect dignity, respect, courtesy, and fairness in a hearing before an immigration judge
because an applicant is entitled, as matter of due process, to a full and fair hearing on his
application); Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that an
alien was deprived of due process in an asylum proceeding, where the immigration judge frequently
interrupted the alien's testimony and allowed her counsel to ask only a few questions in series,
assumed the role of counsel for the government, and prevented the alien from presenting expert
testimony); Naw v. Gonzales, 138 F. App'x 991, 992 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an immigration
judge's failure to explain the standards upon which a pro se alien's application for asylum would be
judged, failure to instruct the alien regarding her burden of proof or what she could do to
substantiate her claim, and cursory examination of the alien before turning questioning over to the
INS attorney deprived the alien of a full and fair hearing in violation of due process); United States
v. Aguirre-Tello, 324 F.3d 1181, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a deportation hearing was
rendered fundamentally unfair, in violation of the alien's due process rights, when the immigration
judge implied that the alien would become eligible for a pardon and that bond was unavailable, and
the alien was not advised of free legal services).
In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that aliens have a protected interest in applying for asylum.
See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) (concluding "that Congress
and the executive have created, at a minimum, a constitutionally protected right to petition our
government for political asylum").
161. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) ("In the enforcement of these [immigration]
policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due
process.").
162. See Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682, 693 (1979) (assuming "a congressional solicitude for fair procedure, absent explicit
statutory language to the contrary").
163. Marincas, 92 F.3d at 203.
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B.

ProceduralDue Process Requirements of a Burden of Proof

Before the government can infringe upon a protected interest, it must
provide procedural due process to the holder of that interest. Procedural
due process requires that an identified party provide a specified amount
1 64
of sufficiently reliable evidence to support a factfinder's findings.

Litigants and the factfinder must know at the outset of a proceeding what
quantum of evidence must be adduced and how the risk of error 66will be
allocated. 165 As the Supreme Court stated in Addington v. Texas, 1
[t]he function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied
in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to
"instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." The standard
the relative importance attached to the
serves... to indicate
67
ultimate decision.

at a minimum
In cases involving individual rights, the standard of proof
68
liberty.
individual
on
places
society
value
the
reflects
Because the Board of Immigration Appeals is charged with providing
guidance on the proper interpretation and administration of immigration
statutes, 169 the federal courts were obligated to wait for the Board to
determine in the first instance what standards Congress intended to
govern findings under § 1158(d)(6). 170 The Supreme Court has made
164. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456 (1985) (holding that the
requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision of a prison
disciplinary board to revoke good time credits).
165. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982).
166. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
167. Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see
also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 n.9 ("[T]he standard of proof instructs the factfinder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions he
draws from that information." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
168. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir.
1971)).
169. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d) (2007) ("[T]he Board, through precedent decisions, shall provide clear
and uniform guidance to the Service, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper
interpretation and administration of the Act and its implementing regulations.").
170. An argument could be made that, in light of the judiciary's expertise in resolving
constitutional issues and the agency's failure to address this deficit over the last eleven years, the
judiciary should have proceeded to mandate the use of a clear and convincing evidentiary standard
as a due process requirement without waiting for the Board to decide the issue.. But, the Supreme
Court recently rebuked the Ninth Circuit for providing an interpretation of an ambiguous statute
before the agency had a chance to act. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
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clear that, when Congress has entrusted an agency with the
responsibility of interpreting and administering a statute, "it is for
agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.' 71 "Chevron established a
'presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency
to possess whatever degree of discretion the
(rather than the courts)
172
ambiguity allows."",

Now that the Board has issued its guidance, federal courts of appeals
must review the constitutional sufficiency of those evidentiary standards,
including the preponderance of the evidence standard. Determining the
proper degree of proof "is the kind of question which has traditionally
been left to the judiciary to resolve, and its resolution is necessary in the
interest of the evenhanded administration of the Immigration and
Nationality Act." 173 In reviewing the constitutional sufficiency of the
Board's proposed preponderance standard, the courts should apply the
three-pronged test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge.
C.

Application of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test

The constitutional sufficiency of procedures, including burdens of
proof, afforded in an administrative hearing varies with the
circumstances.174 The Supreme Court has made clear that "due process,
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances"' 175 but "is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.' ' 176 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court established a

Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). In Brand X, the FCC adopted an interpretation of provisions of
the Communications Act that was at odds with an earlier Ninth Circuit interpretation, resulting in
confusion in the provisions' application. Id. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court's
interpretation could not override the agency's reading of the Act. Id.
171. Id.(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984)).
172. Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
173. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966) (citations omitted).
174. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972)).
175. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
176. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (internal alteration omitted)).
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tripartite test for evaluating the sufficiency of procedures to safeguard
protected interests.177 A court must review
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that 17the
8
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
This analysis comprises the general approach employed by the judiciary
to determine what procedures due process requires whenever79
governmental action would infringe 180upon a protected interest,
including in the context of immigration.
1.

Affected Private Interests

Courts must consider the degree and length of potential deprivation
that may follow a particular governmental decision in assessing the
177. Id. at 334-35.
178. Id. at 335.
179. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 148 (1991). Legal commentators have applied the
Mathews test to evaluate procedural safeguards in a variety of contexts. See generally Evelyn H.
Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals 's
Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 481 (2005) (arguing that the summary
affirmance regulations of the Board compromise immigrants' due process rights); Matthew R. Hall,
Essay, ProceduralDue Process Meets National Security: The Problem of Classified Evidence in
Immigration Proceedings,35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 515 (2002) (proposing that an immigration judge
confronted with classified evidence should assume an inquisitorial, rather than an adjudicative, role
to comply with due process); Peter Gruman, The ProceduralDue Process Rights of Legalization
Applicants Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: These Are the Procedures that
Try Men's Souls, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1381 (1988) (discussing the constitutional inadequacy of
legalization procedures); see also Stephen B. Brauerman, Balancing the Burden: The Constitutional
Justificationfor Requiring the Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retardation Before
Imposing the Death Penalty, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 401 (2004) (arguing that the Due Process Clause
requires the government to prove the absence of mental retardation to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt before the imposition of a death sentence); Frank LaSalle, Comment, The Civil False Claims
Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisitefor Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L.
REV. 497 (1995) (applying the Mathews test and arguing that the Due Process Clause requires more
than a preponderance of the evidence standard to support imposition of the civil forfeiture provision
of the False Claims Act); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (considering the
question of what procedures are necessary to meet due process and arguing that participation of an
independent adjudicator is one element of a minimum floor of procedural safeguards).
180. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (applying the Mathews test to evaluate the
constitutional sufficiency of procedures provided to the reentry of a resident alien).
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sufficiency of an administrative decision-making process.' 8 ' The
Supreme Court has considered only one situation in which Congress
failed to specify a burden of proof. 182 On multiple occasions, the Court
identified losses of individual liberty sufficiently serious to warrant the
imposition of an elevated burden of proof.183 These determinations
include state proceedings to sever parental rights,' 8486proceedings to
185
deportation, 87
civil commitment,
determine juvenile delinquency,
denaturalization,1 88 and expatriation. 189 These cases demonstrate that,
given the substantial liberty interests at stake, the Due Process Clause
compels the government to adduce clear and convincing evidence that a
noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application to support a
finding of frivolousness under § 1158(d)(6) and to justify the attendant
sanction of a permanent bar on the ability to seek immigration benefits.
Removal from the United States implicates a fundamental liberty
interest. The Supreme Court has held that an alien holds a substantial
interest in a deportation proceeding:
This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that
may follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our
Government to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a
foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification.
In words apposite to the question before us, we have spoken of
"the solidity of proof that is required for a judgment entailing
the consequences of deportation ....
"'90
The Court has also recognized "the immediate hardship of deportation"
especially on those
aliens who have established family, social, and
9'
ties.'
economic
In other circumstances, the Court has stressed that a complete and
permanent severing of rights warrants heightened due process
181. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.

182. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966).
183. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982).
184. Id.

185. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
186. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
187. See generally Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
188. See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 123 (1943).
189. See Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955) (per curiam).
190. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285 (quoting Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957)).
191. Id. at 286.
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safeguards. 192 In Santosky v. Kramer,'93 the Supreme Court determined
what procedural safeguards should govern a proceeding to terminate
parental rights. The Court reasoned that "[w]hether the loss threatened
by a particular type of proceeding is sufficiently grave to warrant more
than average certainty on the part of the factfinder turns on both the
nature of the private interest threatened and the permanency of the
threatened loss.' 194 The permanency of the severing of rights weighed
heavily in the Court's balancing of interests:
When the State initiates a parental rights termination
proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental
liberty interest, but to end it. "If the State prevails, it will have
worked a unique kind of deprivation .... A parent's interest in
the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate
his or her
' 95
one."'
commanding
a
therefore,
is,
status
parental
Because the decision terminating parental rights is 'final and
irrevocable" once affirmed on appeal, the Court found that parents'
interests weighed heavily against the use of the preponderance standard
at state-initiated permanent neglect proceedings. 96 The Court also
emphasized the permanency and "overwhelming finality" of the decision
to terminate life-sustaining treatment in justifying its approval of the
state's imposition of the clear and convincing burden of proof in Cruzan
v. Director,Missouri Department of Health.' 97
As in Santosky, the first factor-the private interest affected-weighs
heavily in favor of heightened procedural safeguards in the context of a
frivolousness determination. Once a finding that an alien knowingly
filed a fraudulent asylum application is affirmed on appeal, the
individual is forever barred from seeking immigration relief in the
United States, no matter what circumstances might befall or have

192. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (holding that, in parental rights
termination proceedings, the preponderance of the evidence standard is inconsistent with due

process where "the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a
preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that
standard is comparatively slight").
193. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

194. Id. at 758.
195. Id. at 759 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
196. Id.
197. 497 U.S. 261,281,283 (1990).
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befallen him. As in the proceeding at issue in Santosky,
"[flew forms of
1' 98
state action are both so severe and so irreversible."
2.

Risk of ErroneousDeprivation and Value ofAdditional Procedural
Safeguards

Under Mathews, the second consideration is the fairness and
reliability of existing procedures and the probable value, if any, of
additional procedural safeguards.' 99 When a proceeding is rife with
potential for an erroneous determination-and when an erroneous
determination will infringe a substantial protected interest-the Due
Process Clause calls for a heightened evidentiary standard. 200 This prong
also militates against the application of the preponderance standard.
Numerous factors magnify the risk of an erroneous finding that an
alien knowingly submitted a fraudulent asylum application. Persons
fleeing persecution are unlikely to possess documentary evidence that
corroborates their claims. 20 Therefore, whether an alien qualifies as a
refugee will largely depend on her testimony, unsupported by physical
evidence.20 2 In addition, many aliens do not speak or read English.20 3
Many are unable to complete their asylum applications themselves or to
review such applications for accuracy or completeness. 20 4 While an alien
who does not speak English has a due process right to a competent
translation of removal proceedings, 20 5 translation errors-which create
198. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
199. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
200. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761-66.
201. In recognition of this fact, the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that the testimony
of the applicant may suffice to sustain her burden without corroboration, so long as the applicant's
testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that she is a
refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
202. See Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in
Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 357, 368 (2003) ("Since applicants can rarely
corroborate their claims with specific independent evidence, establishing the facts in refugee cases
usually depends on the value of applicants' testimonies.").
203. See, e.g., Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cit. 1990) ("Forms are frequently
filled out by poor, illiterate people who do not speak English and are unable to retain counsel.");
Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 342 n.l (9th Cir. 1994).
204. See Chen v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the petitioner could not
understand English, did not fill out his asylum application, and likely could not verify its accuracy).
205. See, e.g., Amadou v. INS, 226 F.3d 724, 726 (6th Cir. 2000); Hartooni, 21 F.3d at 340;
Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36-38 (2d. Cit. 1984). Regulations also provide for a competent
translation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.44 (2007) ("Any person acting as interpreter.., shall ... translate
accurately."); id. § 103.2.
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the appearance of inconsistencies, evasiveness, or an inability to
describe incidents of persecution in sufficient detail-are not
uncommon. 20 6 A noncitizen has no absolute right to counsel in a removal
proceeding; rather, he is guaranteed the opportunity to seek
representation at no expense to the government. 0 7 Removal hearings are
not strictly governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence,20 8 and hearsay
may be considered.20 9
In addition, frivolousness findings are intimately tied to issues of
witness credibility and veracity. 210 Immigration judges are required to
make judgments that are inherently subjective. Rejection of a
noncitizen's asylum claim, for instance, may be based on an immigration
judge's evaluation of an asylum seeker's demeanor, a judgment that may
be skewed by subconscious cultural norms and that is essentially
unreviewable through a written record.2 '
Evidence suggests that immigration judges may base adverse
credibility findings on inappropriate considerations.21 2 In response to a
series of scathing appellate court decisions and media accounts of
apparently biased and bullying immigration judges, 2 1 3 the Attorney
206. See, e.g., Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcrofl, 329 F.3d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 2002); Perez-Lastor
v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 780-82 (9th Cir. 2000).
207. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4) (2000). The statute provides that, at the time of filing an
application for asylum, the government must advise the alien of the privilege of being represented
by counsel and provide him with a list of attorneys who have indicated their availability to represent
aliens in asylum proceedings on a pro bono basis. Id.
208. See, e.g., Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 259 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001); Maroon v. INS, 364
F.2d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 1966); Yiannopoulos v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1957).
209. See de Hernandez v. INS, 498 F.2d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Impastato
v. O'Rourke, 211 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1954); see also Matter of Ponco, 15 I. & N. Dec. 120, 123
(B.I.A. 1974) ("The hearsay nature of a given item of evidence may well have a substantial effect
on the probative value of that evidence; however, if relevant, hearsay evidence is admissible in
deportation proceedings.").
210. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976) (noting the problematic nature of
determinations impacted by witness credibility).
211. See, e.g., Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 2003); Paredes-Urrestarazu
v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 818 (9th Cir. 1994); but see Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.
1999).
212. Quick, and potentially pre-ordained, findings of credibility also may be immigration judges'
means of dealing with a staggering caseload. See Bernstein, supra note 39, at 1.
213. See, e.g., Errol Louis, It's Time for U.S. to Bridle Unfair Judges, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug.
15, 2006, at 27 ("Of all the maddening miscarriages of justice that stain the land, few are more
sickening than the abuses meted out by the incompetents, bigots and bullies among the nation's 224
immigration judges. In far too many cases, immigrants facing deportation or seeking asylum in the
United States end up staking their very lives on judges who either don't know the law or don't care
about applying it fairly.").
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General in August 2006 ordered a national review of immigration courts
and conceded that some immigration judges "can aptly be described as
intemperate or even abusive and [their] work must improve. ' 214 Perhaps
he was referring to examples such as these from the immigration bench:
" A Boston immigration judge greeted a Ugandan woman
seeking asylum by jeering, "Me Tarzan, you Jane. 21 5
* One immigration judge mishandled a political asylum claim
asserted by an Albanian citizen based on testimony from a
document expert, when that expert did not speak or read
Albanian.2 16
* An immigration judge found that a Mexican citizen failed to
demonstrate that her deportation would cause exceptional
hardship to her five minor United States citizen children and
her husband. The judge appeared to discount the hardship to
her family because the couple continued to have children
while her status was pending. The judge chastised the couple
for "directly contribut[ing] to [the hardship] by their own
actions" and for putting their children "in that
predicament., 217 She also reprimanded the husband for
"mak[ing] their life a little bit more difficult by creating yet
21 8
another child.,
* A New York immigration judge was criticized by the Second
Circuit for "pervasive bias and hostility," "combative and
insulting language," and remarks "implying that any asylum
family planning policies
claim based on China's coercive
21 9
would be presumed incredible.,
* The Third Circuit rebuked a Philadelphia immigration judge
for repeated instances of "browbeating," "belligerent
questioning and a failure to consider relevant evidence., 220 In
214. See Pamela A. MacLean, Wide DisparitiesAre Found in Granting Asylum, NAT'L L. J.,

Aug. 14, 2006, at 5.
215. Louis, supra note 213, at 27. This judge, Thomas Ragno, was temporarily suspended but
then rejoined the bench. Id.
216. See Richard B. Schmitt, Bush Administration Moves to Improve Immigration Judges, DAILY
PRESS, Aug. 10, 2006, at A10.
217. Cortez-Rivera v. Gonzales, 226 F. App'x 744, 745 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
218. Id.
219. Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judge Is Reassigned to a Desk Job, N.Y. TIMES, March 13,
2007, at B2. In March 2007, this immigration judge, Jeffrey S. Chase, was relieved of courtroom
duties. Id. at B 1.
220. Louis, supra note 213, at 27.
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one case, he denied asylum to a Pakistani woman, whose
father had been assassinated, because the court's translator
mistakenly translated "parents" as "parents in law." The judge
decried, "You've blown your cover. I see now her parents
aren't even dead."22'
A Department of Justice spokesman announced that, between June 2006
and March 2007, eleven of the nation's roughly 215 immigration judges
were temporarily suspended from courtroom duties "based on concerns
about how they were conducting immigration proceedings., 222 Some
judges have since returned to the bench.22 3
A telling indicator of the lack of reliability in removal proceedings is
the variance in asylum rulings among individual immigration judges.
The February 2005 report of the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), charged by Congress to
study the degree of consistency and reliability of adjudicating asylum
claims in removal proceedings, analyzed over 35,000 rulings of
immigration judges over a period of three years.224 It found that
immigration judges, even within the same court, had "significantly
different rates of granting or denying asylum claims. 225 The rates that
individual immigration judges granted asylum ranged from zero percent

221. Id. This judge, Donald Ferlise, is no longer hearing cases. Id.
222. Bernstein, supra note 219, at B1.
223. Id.
224. The USCIRF, an independent government agency, was created by the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, Executive
Summary in REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
1,
3-4
(2005),
,
available
at
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/2005/february/execsum.pdf. IRFA charged
the Commission with studying whether the 1996 changes to United States asylum law impeded
America's obligation to offer refuge to those suffering persecution. Id. at 1. The study focused on
the effects of the procedure of expedited removal created by IIRIRA. Id. The study analyzed 36,800
rulings of 278 immigration judges from fourteen immigration courts between 2000 and 2003. See
Patrick Baier, Selected Statistical Analyses of Immigration Judge Rulings on Asylum Applications,
FY 2000-2003, in REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME If:EXPERT
REPORTS
674,
678-79
(2005),
available
at
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/2005/february/immigrationJudgeStats.pdf.
225. U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, supranote 224, at 5. The average acceptance rate
of immigration courts varied from 5.6% in the Krome Service Processing Center in southern Florida
to 47.1% in San Francisco. Baier, supra note 224, at 681-82. The report found that acceptance rates
for immigration judges within the same court varied the most for Atlanta, Elizabeth, southern
Florida (the Krome Service Processing Center and Miami), and New York City. Id. at 694. The only
immigration courts with consistent acceptance rates among immigration judges were Chicago,
Houston, Guaynabo, and San Pedro. Id. at 694-95.
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to eighty-one percent.2 26 The study found that immigration judges
frequently denied asylum claims based on adverse credibility
determinations premised on unreliable or incomplete documents.2 27 The
report also detailed the dramatic effect of representation on the ultimate
grant or denial of asylum seekers' claims: twenty-five percent of asylum
seekers represented by lawyers were granted asylum, while only two
228
percent of those who were unrepresented were awarded asylee status.
An even more comprehensive study, released in August 2006, was
conducted by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at
Syracuse University. 229 The study reviewed nearly 300,000 asylum cases
from 208 immigration judges from fiscal years 1994 to 2005.23 0 It found
that the average immigration judge denied asylum claims sixty-five
percent of the time. 23 1 Rates of granting asylum varied from
approximately three percent by a Miami judge to approximately ninety

226. Certain immigration judges in southern Florida, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York City
never granted asylum during the period of the study. Id. at 689-90. Another immigration judge in
New York City, on the other hand, granted asylum over eighty percent of the time. See id. at 690.
227. U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, supra note 224, at 5, 7.
228. See id. at 4, 7; see also Susan Kyle et al., supra note 35, at 407-09; see generally Charles
Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A Survey of Alternative
Practicesin REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME II: EXPERT REPORTS

232
(2004),
available
at
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/2005/february/legalAssist.pdf
(analyzing
the impact of representation on asylum decisions by immigration office and surveying various
approaches of providing representation to detained asylum seekers).
229. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), SYRACUSE UNIV.,
TRAC IMMIGRATION REPORT: IMMIGRATION JUDGES, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2007) [hereinafter TRAC IMMIGRATION JUDGES]; TRAC ASYLUM PROCESS,

supra note 18; see also MacLean, supra note 214, at 5; Bernstein, supra note 39, at I ("Studies
highlight stark disparities in judgment, like 90 percent of asylum cases granted by one judge and 9
percent down the hall.").
The release of the study coincided with an announcement by the Attorney General that the EOIR
would implement twenty-two measures "to enhance the performance of the Immigration
Courts... " Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines
Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag-520.html. These reforms include establishing
annual performance evaluations, increasing oversight to detect high reversal rates, requiring
competency tests for new immigration judges, and improving procedures for handling complaints.
See id.; DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE IMMIGRATION COURTS AND THE BOARD OF

IMMIGRATION APPEALS, http://trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/detail/PI04.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2007)

(describing the reforms); MacLean, supra note 214, at 5. As of March 13, 2007, EOIR had not
begun to give performance evaluations. See Bernstein, supra note 219, at B 1.
230. TRAC IMMIGRATION JUDGES, supranote 229.

231. Id.
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percent by a judge in New York.232 The study confirmed the USCIRF's
finding of the import of representation. It found that unrepresented
asylum applicants were denied asylum ninety-three percent of the time,
while represented applicants had a denial rate of sixty-four percent.2 33
Finally, the safeguards provided by § 1158(d)(6)-notice and an
opportunity to explain inconsistencies-do not provide adequate
protection against the risk of erroneous deprivation of an asylum
seeker's fundamental interests. While the statute provides that an alien
must receive notice of the consequences of the filing of a frivolous
asylum application, 234 its lack of specificity suggests that notice may
take the form of a piece of paper provided with a blank asylum
application.2 35 Neither the Board nor any court has held that an
immigration judge must explain the consequences of filing a frivolous
application and receive confirmation from the alien that she understands
the severity of the sanction.2 36

232. Id. The TRAC report found that denial rates for the 208 judges ranged from a low of ten
percent to a high of ninety-eight percent. Id. For a table with denial rates and individual rankings of
the 208 immigration judges from fiscal year 2000 to 2005, see TRAC, Asylum Judge Denial Rates
by
Immigration
Judge,
FY
2000
FY
2005,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/include/judge0005_name-r.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2007). For denial rates and rankings from 1994 to 1999, see TRAC, Asylum Judge Denial Rates by
Immigration
Judge,
FY
1994
FY
1999,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/include/judge_9499_name-r.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2007). For detailed information on the backgrounds and decisions of individual immigration judges,
see
TRAC,
Immigration
Judge
Reports-Asylum,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
233. TRAC IMMIGRATION JUDGES, supra note 229.
234. See 8 U.S.C. § I I58(d)(4), (6) (2000).
235. See In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 155 (B.I.A. 2007). The Board noted that Form 1-589,
the asylum application, contains a written warning that "[a]pplicants determined to have knowingly
made a frivolous application for asylum will be permanently ineligible for any benefits under the
Immigration and Nationality Act." Id. But see Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 275 n.3 (2d
Cir. 2007) (observing that In re Y-L- does not resolve whether the notice in Form 1-589 suffices to
satisfy the notice requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6)). The Board did not adopt a requirement that
the immigration judge ensure that the asylum seeker has heard, been relayed, or has understood the
warning. See In re Y-L, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 155.
236. Some appellate decisions note that immigration judges have chosen to provide oral notice
and to secure an admission that the noncitizen understands the consequences of filing a frivolous
asylum application. See, e.g., Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d 763, 766 (11th Cir. 2006)
(noting that the immigration judge advised the petitioners of the consequences of filing a frivolous
asylum application and secured an affirmation that they understood and did not need to change their
applications); Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that the alien
received warnings throughout the proceedings); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209, 1211 (8th
Cir. 2005) (recording that the alien received oral and written warnings); Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399
F.3d 582, 586 (3d Cir. 2005) (reporting that the immigration judge warned the alien of the
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In addition, the opportunity to appeal an immigration judge's finding
of frivolousness to the Board of Immigration Appeals is of limited value.
The number of cases appealed to the Board has increased dramatically
over the last few years.237 Under recently mandated streamlining
procedures, 238 all cases are assigned to a single Board member for
disposition,2 39 unless a screening panel determines that a case meets
certain criteria for assignment to a three-member panel.24 ° Single board
members now issue around fifty decisions a day, typically one-sentence
rulings affirming denials. 2 4' The 2005 USCIRF study found that, after
regulations were changed to allow summary affirmances by the Board,
the rate of reversal of an immigration judge's removal order dropped
from twenty-four percent to approximately three percent.242 The rate that
the government was sustained during this latter period was much higher,
consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application and allowed him to confer with counsel);
Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1337 n.5 (1 th Cir. 2001) (noting that the alien
received two written notices and that the immigration judge gave one or two oral warnings).
237. In 2004, the Board received and adjudicated fifty percent more appeals than in 2001. Kyle et
al., supra note 35, at 413. In 2001, the Board received 27,900 new appeals and adjudicated 31,800.
Id. at n.17. In 2004, the Board received 41,300 new cases and adjudicated 48,700. Id. Ninety-eight
percent of appeals to the Board from 2002 to 2005 were filed by aliens. Id. at 413.
238. In 2002, the Attorney General reduced board membership from twenty-three to eleven
members and set tight deadlines to reduce a large backlog. See Bernstein, supra note 39, at 11. On
March 15, 2002, Board Chairman Lori Scialabba authorized the use of a single Board member's
affirmance, without opinion, for asylum cases. See Kyle et al., supra note 35, at 414 & n. 18. For an
analysis of the 2002 reforms to streamline Board proceedings, see Susan Burkhardt, The Contours
of Conformity: Behavioral Decision Theory and the Pitfalls of the 2002 Reforms of Immigration
Procedures, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35 (2004) (discussing the procedural reforms and applying social
science research to analyze the procedural reforms' adverse effect on administrative decisionmaking).
239. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (2007) (case management system).
240. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6), a case may only be assigned to a three-judge panel if the case
presents the following:
(i) The need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration judges;
(ii) The need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures;
(iii) The need to review a decision by an immigration judge or the Service that is not in
conformity with the law or with applicable precedents;
(iv) The need to resolve a case or controversy of major national import;
(v) The need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an immigration judge; or
(vi) The need to reverse the decision of an immigration judge or the Service, other than a reversal
under § 1003.1 (e)(5) [where the reversal is plainly consistent with and required by intervening
Board or judicial precedent, by an intervening Act of Congress, or by an intervening final
regulation].
241. Bernstein, supra note 39 at 11; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (affirmance without opinion).
242. U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, supra note 224, at 7; Kyle, et al., supra note 35,
at 414-15.
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at nineteen percent.24 3 The study concludes that "[s]tatistically, it is
highly unlikely that any asylum seeker denied by an immigration judge
will find protection by appealing to the [Board of Immigration
Appeals]. ' ' 244

Noncitizens also face an uphill battle in appealing adverse decisions
rendered by the Board to the federal courts of appeals. 245 The
Immigration and Nationality Act mandates that circuit courts accept an
immigration court's factual findings unless the evidence in the record
compels a contrary interpretation.24 6 Since an alien is unlikely to possess
corroborating evidence, 4 7 it is highly unlikely that the record ever will
"compel" a determination contrary to that reached by the Board. And, at
least one circuit has held in the context of § 1158(d)(6) that, when the
noncitizen urges one interpretation of the evidence but the Board has
adopted another, the reviewing court must adopt the Board's
interpretation unless the record compels the contrary result. 248 Given the

substantial risk of an erroneous determination, procedural due process
requires a more exacting burden of proof than the preponderance of the
evidence standard.249
243. Kyle, et al., at 415. See also Richard B. Schmitt, Bush Administration Moves to Improve
Immigration Judges, DAILY PRESS, Aug. 10, 2006, at A10 (reporting that, under the new
streamlining procedures, Board members often render decisions within minutes and that the rate at
which Board members rule against noncitizens has soared).
244.

U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, supra note 224, at 7.

245. The number of appeals in the United States Courts of Appeals increased forty-one percent
between 1990 and 2002 and nineteen percent between 1998 and 2002. Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, Table 2.3: U.S. Courts of Appeals (Excludes Federal Circuit). Appeals Filed by Type of
31,
2006),
Agency,
(Mar.
Originating
Appeal
and
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table203.pdf. This elevation was driven mostly by the
increase in appeals from decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id. ("The increase in
filings of administrative agency appeals began in February 2002, after the Attorney General ordered
the Board of Immigration Appeals to clear its backlog of cases, stating that this action was required
to help prevent terrorist attacks and enforce the nation's immigration laws. 449 cases were appealed
from the Board of Immigration Appeals. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table B-3. U.S. Courts
of Appeals-Sources of Appeals and OriginalProceedings Commenced, by Circuit, During the 12115
(2006),
30, 2002
Through
2006, at
Month
Periods Ending September
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/b3.pdf.
246. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000).
247. Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987).
248. See Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937, 943, 945 (8th Cir. 2006).
249. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982) (citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36 (1977)), the Supreme Court ordered a higher burden of
proof based in part on the Court's observation that permanent neglect proceedings left
determinations vulnerable to the subjective values of the judge. The Court also noted that such
proceedings are susceptible to judgments based on cultural or class bias, because parents subject to
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Governmental Interest in MaintainingCurrentProcedures

The final consideration under Mathews involves weighing the
governmental interests affected, including the function of the statutory
provision and the fiscal and administrative burdens that a heightened
burden of proof would impose. 250 At least four governmental interests
are at stake in removal proceedings involving applications for asylum
where an immigration judge may potentially make a finding under
§ 1 158(d)(6): the government's interests in the efficient administration
of immigration law,251 in granting refuge to persecuted persons in
compliance with treaty and statutory obligations, in punishing those who
try to remain in the country through fraudulent means, and in deterring
future attempts to monopolize judicial proceedings for fraudulent ends.
A burden of proof more exacting than preponderance of the evidence is
consistent with all of these interests. In particular, the government's
goals of identifying fraudulent asylum applications, punishing the
offending alien, and deterring others who would follow in his footsteps
are served by procedures that promote an accurate determination of
whether fraud has been committed.2 52 A burden of proof more likely to
yield an accurate finding would also further the government's additional
interest in providing a just proceeding.25 3
Unlike a constitutional requirement to supply an additional or more
elaborate hearing 254 or government-supplied counsel, finding that due
termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups. Id. at 763.
250. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
251. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) ("The government's interest in efficient
administration of the immigration laws at the border also is weighty. Further, it must weigh heavily
in the balance that control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the
control of the executive and the legislature.").
252. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767.
253. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ("Under the [state statute],... the State
has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill or if they do not
pose some danger to themselves or others. Since the preponderance standard creates the risk of
increasing the number of individuals erroneously committed, it is at least unclear to what extent, if
any, the state's interests are furthered by using a preponderance standard in such commitment
proceedings.").
254. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires some kind of a hearing
before the state may deprive a person of liberty or property. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (termination of employment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
606-07 (1979) (a state's confinement of a child in a mental hospital); Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. I, 18 (1978) (termination of utility service); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
579 (1975) (a public school's suspension of a student); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58
(1974) (forfeiture of a prisoner's good-time credits); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-84 (1972)
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process requires an elevated burden of proof would reduce factual error
255
without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the government.
Imposing an intermediate evidentiary standard also should not affect the
flexibility or speed of the factfinding process.256 And it should not create
an additional administrative burden for immigration judges because they
are already familiar with applying this burden of proof in removal
proceedings. 25 ' For example, immigration judges currently must
determine that the government has established an alien's removability by
clear and convincing evidence before issuing a removal order. 258 Since
evaluating whether a body of evidence suffices to establish an alien's
removability by clear and convincing evidence is integral to immigration
judges' regular duties, applying this analytical framework to determine
whether the evidence supports a finding that an alien has knowingly
filed a frivolous asylum application should impose no great hardship
upon the immigration court.
D.

The Casefor a Clear and Convincing Burden of Prooffor
§ 1158(d)(6) Findings

Which burden of proof will satisfy due process depends upon the
substantiality of the interests at stake. Given the instances in which the
Supreme Court has held that due process concerns warrant a higher
burden of proof,2 9 it is manifest that the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard should apply to findings under § 1158(d)(6). An
analysis of the contexts in which the three traditional evidentiary
standards apply demonstrates that only the intermediate standard is

(issuance of a writ allowing repossession of property); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)

(termination of welfare benefits).
255. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767.
256. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 359, 366 (1970).
257. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 (finding that, because New York Family Court judges already
were familiar with a higher evidentiary standard in other contexts, imposing the standard of clear
and convincing evidence would not amount to a real administrative burden in a parental rights
termination proceeding involving a charge of permanent neglect).
258. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2000); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966); see also
Zerrei v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 342, 345 (2d Cir. 2006); Hernandez-Guadarrama v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d
674, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 312 (1st Cir. 1992).
259. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) ("This Court has
mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'-when the individual
interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than
mere loss of money."' (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756)).
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mandated by the Due Process Clause and is appropriate for § 1158(d)(6)
determinations.
1.

Preponderanceof the Evidence

The Board determined that findings under § 1158(d)(6) need only be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 260 This standard is
typically utilized in civil proceedings. In Addington, the Supreme Court
summarized the rationale for this burden of proof in this way:
At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a
monetary dispute between private parties. Since society has a
minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits,
plaintiff's burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the
evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion.2 6'
While the Board apparently disagreed,26 2 effecting permanent removal
and prohibiting an alien from applying for immigration benefits-no
matter how dire future circumstances may be, and regardless of the
familial ties developed in the United States--constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty or property interests. 2 63 The judiciary should not

deem the risk that a deserving alien may face a permanent bar on
petitioning for immigration benefits as a minimal societal concern.
Weighing the risks of an erroneous decision also counsels against the
preponderance standard in the context of a § 1158(d)(6) finding. The
primary function of the burden of proof is to allocate the risk of an
264 I
nai
erroneous factfinding between the two parties.
If an alien files a
fraudulent asylum application, and the immigration court does not
determine the evidence of fraud sufficient to support a finding of
frivolousness under § 1158(d)(6), the evidence may still be used to
support an adverse credibility finding and, on that ground, to deny the
asylum application. Thus, the efforts of the government will not have

260. In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 157-58 (B.I.A. 2007).
261. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).

262. The Board noted that a finding of frivolousness "is a preemptive determination which, once
made, forever bars an alien from any benefit under the Act." In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 157.

However, the Board did not deem these "severe consequences" to warrant an elevated burden of
proof. See id. at 158.
263. See Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).

264. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 (1982).
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been wasted. Without the frivolousness finding, the alien will be eligible
to apply for adjustment of status, voluntary removal, or other benefits for
which she may be eligible.265 If the alien does not qualify for these
benefits, then the Department of Homeland Security, or an immigration
judge, may needlessly spend time processing an undeserving claim. The
risk of an erroneous frivolousness finding to the asylum seeker,
however, is profound. The individual alien should not be asked to share
equally with society the risk of error, since the risk of injury to herpermanent removal and denial of the opportunity to apply for any
immigration benefits for which she may become eligible in the futureis significantly greater than any possible harm to the government.26 6
In addition, the government has an obligation-imposed by the
Constitution, statute, and treaties-not to deny access to our immigration
laws without adequate justification. In the words of the Supreme Court
in Addington, "[s]ince the preponderance standard creates the risk of
increasing the number of individuals erroneously [denied opportunity to
the state's
apply for benefits], it is at least unclear to what extent, if any,
2 67
interests are furthered by using a preponderance standard.
2.

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

At the other end of the continuum is the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard applicable in criminal cases. Society has considered this
stringent standard to be appropriate when "the interests of the defendant
are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit
constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of
proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an
erroneous judgment. 26 8 When it is incumbent upon the government to
doubt, "society imposes almost
prove an element beyond a reasonable
269
the entire risk of error upon itself.
The Court's analysis in Addington of whether the government must
prove a person's mental illness beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil
commitment proceeding illustrates the inappropriateness of that standard
for § 1158(d)(6) determinations.27 ° In Addington, the Court found the
265. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2000).
266. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
267. Id. at 426.
268. Id. at 423.
269. Id. at 424.
270. Id. at 428-31.
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"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to be too stringent for a number of
reasons, many of which apply to frivolousness findings within removal
proceedings. First, the Court stressed that, in these civil proceedings,
state power is not exercised in a punitive sense.271 Second, the Court
found that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, heralded as "a
critical part of the moral force of the criminal law," historically has been
reserved for criminal cases.272 Third, the full force of the idea that the
threat of error to the individual must be minimized even at the risk that
some who are guilty may go free does not apply to civil commitment.273
Fourth, while the primary evaluation in a criminal proceeding is
intrinsically fact-based, the inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding
turns on mental health experts' discernment of the "meaning of the
facts. 2 74 The Court stressed its concern that, given the lack of certainty
and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnoses, it is unclear whether a state
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous to society.275
Similarly, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is likely too
stringent for the context of a frivolousness determination under
§ 1158(d)(6). Removal is not criminal and historically has not been
considered punitive in nature.276 Determining whether an alien
knowingly filed an asylum application with a fraudulent material
element involves a simpler finding of fact than the decision to commit an
individual for mental illness. Rarely are experts called to opine as to the
"meaning" of any facts, so a less stringent burden of proof is not
necessary for that reason. But the dearth of objective evidence refuting
an asylum seeker's claim means that a frivolousness finding often will
be based on inconsistencies in the alien's testimony and perhaps on a
reading of the alien's demeanor on the stand. Without objective, nearly
conclusive evidence of fraud, it would be almost impossible for the
government to establish a willful filing of a frivolous application beyond
a reasonable doubt.277
271. Id. at 428.
272. Id. (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 429.
275. Id.
276. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999); INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730

(1893).
277. In light of "the inescapable inability of the INS to demonstrate that the petitioner's recital of
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3.

Clearand Convincing Evidence

A finding under § 1158(d)(6) permanently deprives an asylum seeker
of any and all immigration benefits.178 Given the seriousness and
permanent character of this determination-made in a proceeding in
which the subjective judgments of an immigration judge are required
and the alien is not guaranteed representation by counsel-the Due
Process Clause requires that clear and convincing evidence support the
factual underpinnings of the finding. This intermediate standard
is less commonly used, but nonetheless "is no stranger to the
civil law." One typical use of the standard is in civil cases
involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal
wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in those
cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of
money[,] and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to
the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by
increasing the plaintiffs burden of proof. Similarly, this Court
has used the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard of
proof to protect particularly important individual interests in
various civil cases.2 79
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has held that "due process places a
heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the
'individual interests at stake ... are both particularly important and more

substantial than mere loss of money.,' 280 Indeed, this level of proof--or
an even higher one-has historically been imposed in cases involving
much less significant (though still important) deprivations, including
281
allegations of civil fraud, lost wills, and oral contracts of bequests.
past persecution is false," the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the asylum statute to place on the asylum
seeker the burden of persuading the immigration judge that her testimony is credible. Mejia-Paiz v.
INS, Ill F.3d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has recognized that practical
considerations may limit a constitutionally-based burden of proof and that "due process does not
require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility" of an
erroneous decision. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977).
278. See 8 U.S.C. § 158(d)(6) (2000).
279. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
280. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
757 (1982) (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424) (second set of internal quotation marks omitted));
accord Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) ("This Court has mandated
an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'-when the individual interests
at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss
of money."' (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756)).
281. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 n.18 (1966))
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In light of the interests held to require application of the clear and
convincing standard, it is apparent that the Constitution requires the
government to satisfy this intermediate burden of proof to support a
finding under § 1158(d)(6). The Court has determined that this
intermediate evidentiary standard is necessary in contexts similar to
those in a removal proceeding where a frivolousness finding is made-in
deportation proceedings,282 denaturalization proceedings, 283 and
expatriation determinations. 84 In Woodby, the Court ruled that, because
deportation could lead to drastic deprivations, "it is impermissible for a
person to be banished from this country upon no higher degree of proof
than applies in a negligence case. 285
In sum, the Due Process Clause requires that clear and convincing
evidence support a finding of frivolousness. A frivolousness finding
implicates an asylum seeker's liberty interests in remaining in the United
States and in not being subject to arbitrary governmental procedures.
The individual's interest is particularly strong because of the complete
and permanent nature of the sanction. The typical lack of documentary
evidence to support an asylum applicant's claim of persecution, the
likely language barrier, the lack of an absolute right to counsel, and the
weight accorded to immigration judges' subjective judgments of witness
credibility infuse asylum proceedings with a high risk of error. The great
variance in immigration judges' rates of granting asylum--even within
the same court-demonstrate the fairly arbitrary nature of asylum
proceedings. The deferential standard of review and the Board's new
streamlining procedure do not afford sufficient protection to an alien
erroneously denied asylum. The governmental interests at stake in
removal proceedings, while weighty, do not suffice to justify a lower
burden of proof. These factors, on balance, weigh in favor of requiring
the government to establish that an alien knowingly filed a fraudulent
asylum application by clear and convincing evidence. Following the
282. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286.
283. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118, 123 (1943).
284. Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 921 (1955) (per curiam). The Court has also held that the
government must meet an intermediate burden of proof in state proceedings to sever parental rights,
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-68, and in civil commitment proceedings, Addington, 441 U.S. at 43133.
285. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 n.6 (quoting Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In Woodby, the Supreme Court emphasized that the clear and convincing burden of
proof was necessary for "all deportation cases, regardless of the length of time the alien has resided
in this country." Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286 n.19.
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dictates of Mathews, the federal courts of appeals should reject the
Board's selection of a preponderance standard.
III.

EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS TO SATISFY ELEMENTS
OF § 1158(d)(6): A PROPOSAL

Once federal courts specify which burden of proof comports with due
process, they must determine what kinds of evidence suffice to meet that
burden under § 1158(d)(6). This Part surveys bodies of evidence that
could support frivolousness determinations and advocates that only
certain types of evidence are sufficiently probative to satisfy elements of
§ 1158(d)(6) under a clear and convincing standard. Consistent with the
case law in this area, evidence of forged documents should satisfy
elements of fabrication and intent. An immigrant's admission of lying on
his asylum application should satisfy the fabrication element, but,
depending on the content of the admission and the surrounding context,
may not satisfy the element of intent. Testimonial evidence that directly
contradicts a material, intentionally false statement in an asylum
application should support a frivolousness finding, but implausibilities
and internal inconsistencies in an applicant's testimony that do not
contradict a statement in an application would not meet the regulatory
requirements for frivolousness. Courts should interrogate the reliability
of documents produced by the government before using them to support
a finding under § 1158(d)(6). Finally, courts should reject demeanorbased findings as support for a frivolousness determination under a clear
and convincing standard.
No court has fully explicated the case law's holdings regarding which
kinds of evidence are probative enough to support a frivolousness
determination, and no court has applied these findings in the context of a
burden of proof. This Part details the judicial opinions applying
§ 1158(d)(6) and argues that the force of the case law is consistent with
the application of a heightened burden of proof and attendant evidentiary
standards. Generally speaking, the case law reflects courts' concern that
the government produce highly probative evidence to support a finding
under § 1158(d)(6) and justify the severe sanction of permanent
removal. For example, the decisions upholding frivolousness
determinations on the basis of forged documents 286 and admissions 287 are
286. Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 854, 857-858 (8th Cir. 2007); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 2005); Selami v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 621, 626-27 (6th Cir. 2005).
287. Aziz, 478 F.3d at 857; Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2006); Barreto-
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consistent with the conclusion that, to comply with due process, the
government must prove that a noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous
asylum application by clear and convincing evidence. However, other
aspects of the case law-in particular the use of testimonial
inconsistencies and an assessment of an asylum seeker's demeanor as
support for findings under § 1158(d)(6)-may be inconsistent with a
heightened evidentiary standard.
A.

ForgedDocuments Can Satisfy Elements of Fabricationand Intent

Forged documents offered by an alien to support a claim of
persecution are sufficiently probative and reliable to support a
frivolousness finding. Aziz v. Gonzales,288 Ignatova v. Gonzales, 289 and
Selami v. Gonzales2 90 demonstrate that tangible evidence of fraud
suffices to establish the elements of intent and fabrication under
§ 1158(d)(6). In Aziz, the Eighth Circuit upheld a frivolousness finding
when the petitioner admitted that she had submitted fraudulent
evidence, 291 including false medical documents, a fabricated marriage
document, and seven fraudulent affidavits.29 2 In Ignatova, the Eighth
Circuit upheld a frivolousness finding where the immigration judge had
concluded that a hospital record was demonstrably fraudulent. 293 The
fraud was made plain by a letter from the issuing hospital, which
represented that it had not treated Ignatova, that it did not employ the
doctors who Ignatova said treated her, and that the stamps and seals on
the counterfeit hospital records were not authentic.294 Similarly, in
Selami, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a frivolousness finding where the
alien tried to prove his claim with a forged newspaper article. 295 The
forgery was evident by the difference in the format and spacing in the
suspect article from the rest of the newspaper 296 and was confirmed

Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1337, 1339 (1 th Cir. 2001).
288. Aziz, 478 F.3d at 857-58.
289. 430 F.3d 1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 2005).
290. 423 F.3d 621, 626-27 (6th Cir. 2005).
291. Aziz, 478 F.3d at 857.

292. Id. at 856 nn.1, 2.
293. Ignatova, 430 F.3d at 1214.
294. Id.
295. Selami, 423 F.3d at 624, 626.

296. Id. at 624.
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when an actual copy of that day's paper showed that the dubious article
was never printed.297
The strength of the evidence of fraud in these cases stems from the
objective verification of the fabrication and the obvious lengths taken by
the noncitizen to forge the documents. When a petitioner admits to
submitting fraudulent documents or an independent source verifies the
fraud, the element of fabrication is conclusively established. No
deductions or extrapolations from muddled testimony that may weaken
the reliability of the finding are necessary. The deliberateness of the
fraud is clearly proven by the time, energy, planning, and
resourcefulness inherent in the alien's manufacture of the evidence.
While a requirement of objective verification of fraud would be too
onerous a standard for the government to meet, the presence of
independent verification of the fraudulent nature of documents should
suffice to satisfy the "deliberate" and "fabrication" elements of
§ 1158(d)(6) by clear and convincing evidence. Assuming the
immigration judge provides the asylum applicant with an opportunity to
explain the counterfeit documents and advises him of the consequences
of knowingly filing a frivolous application, the only additional inquiry is
whether the alien submitted the documents to support a statement in the
asylum application. If the fraudulent documents relate to a material
element of the application, then all elements of § 1 158(d)(6) will be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
B.

Documents Producedby the Government Must Be Testedfor
Reliability Before Accepted as Supportfor a FrivolousnessFinding

Where the government produces documents that call into question the
veracity of an asylum applicant's claim, an immigration judge should
ensure that the documents are sufficiently reliable and probative to
support a finding under § 1158(d)(6). Asylum regulations provide that
the Department of State receive every asylum application.298 At its
option, the Department may supply (1) detailed information on the
conditions within the asylum applicant's native country that the
Department deems relevant to her eligibility for asylum; 299 (2) an
assessment of the accuracy of the applicant's assertions about conditions

297. Id.
298. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 1(a) (2007).
299. Id.
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in her native country and her particular likelihood of persecution; 30 0 (3)
information about whether persons who are similarly situated to the
asylum applicant are persecuted or tortured in that country and the
frequency of such persecution or torture; 30 ' and (4) any other
information that the Department considers relevant. 30 2 An immigration
judge also has the option of requesting specific comments from the
Department of State regarding individual cases or types of claims.30 3
Therefore, an immigration judge often will need to assess the probative
value, and ultimate effect on an asylum applicant's claim, of documents
produced by the Department of State regarding the likelihood of
persecution faced by the asylum seeker.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Alexandrov v. Gonzales30 4 is consistent
with a requirement that the government demonstrate the reliability of
hearsay evidence before using that evidence to support a frivolousness
determination. There, the court held that reports supplied by the
Department of State were inherently unreliable hearsay and did not
constitute adequate support for a finding under § 1158(d)(6). °5 The
court highlighted several factors necessary to demonstrate reliability: (1)
the absence of errors in the document,30 6 (2) knowledge of how the data
in the document was compiled and how the document was prepared,30 7
(3) knowledge of the identity and background of persons active in
compiling or communicating the data, 30 8 and (4) possession of the means
to ascertain and evaluate any bias inherent in a source of data.30 9
Because the memoranda in Alexandrov did not possess sufficient indicia
of reliability, the Sixth Circuit held that the immigration judge erred in
relying on them as the sole support for a finding under § 1158(d)(6).31 °
Courts should limit the use of hearsay as support for a frivolousness
finding to situations in which its reliability can be thoroughly tested. So
long as the parties and the court possess the information listed above300. Id § 208.1 l(b)(1).
301. Id. § 208.1 l(b)(2).

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. § 208.1 l(b)(3).
Id. § 208.11 (c).
442 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 407.
See id. at 400.

307.
308.
309.
310.

See id. at 401-03.
See id. at 400-03, 407.
See id. at 399.
Id. at 407.
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assuming the asylum seeker is represented by a competent attorney,
which is not guaranteed by § 1158-an asylum applicant presumably
could identify deficiencies in the evidence, and a reviewing court could
evaluate the reliability of the hearsay. 31' Future courts will need to
grapple with whether hearsay may constitute sufficient evidence that an
asylum applicant knowingly submitted a fraudulent application.
C.

An Admission of Falsehood Will Establish FabricationBut May
Not Always Satisfy the Intent Element

An admission of falsehood in an asylum application may be
sufficiently probative to support a frivolousness finding. Barreto-Claro
v. U.S. Attorney General3 12 and Kifleyesus v. Gonzales313 involved
admissions of fraud. 3 14 In Barreto-Claro,the Eleventh Circuit found that
the elements of deliberateness and fabrication were satisfied where the
alien submitted two materially different asylum applications. 1 5
Similarly, in Kifleyesus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a frivolousness
finding where the alien admitted the falsity of some representations after
the immigration judge received a letter from the alien's ex-fianc6
claiming that Kifleyesus had lied in her asylum application. 31 6 On their
facts, Barreto-Claroand Kifleyesus are consistent with the application of
a heightened evidentiary standard.
While an admission of falsehood will typically establish fabrication,
not all admissions will satisfy the intent element of § 1158(d)(6) by clear
and convincing evidence. Whether the element of deliberateness is met
should turn upon the plausibility of the alien's explanation for the
misrepresentation. For instance, if Kifleyesus's allegations of domestic
violence and of being overborne by her husband's will 317 had been
credible, this explanation might have been adequate to repel a
frivolousness finding. Similarly, if an alien explains that statements in
her asylum application are false because a "notario" completed her

311. See id. at 406.
312. 275 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2001).
313. 462 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2006).
314. Aziz v. Gonzales, discussed above, also involved a petitioner's admission of having lied on
her asylum application and having submitted multiple fraudulent documents in support of her claims
of persecution. See 478 F.3d 854, 856-57 (8th Cir. 2007).
315. Barreto-Claro,275 F.3d at 1336-37.
316. Kifleyesus, 462 F.3d at 940.
317. Id. at 938 n.1,942.
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application and duped her into signing a form in English that she could
not read, a1 8 that explanation may demonstrate a lack of intent to defraud
the government.
In addition, immigration judges must ensure that any admission of
falsehood actually relates to a substantial, material statement in the
asylum application. 31 9 Recognizing the dubious circumstances under
which many applications are prepared, courts have held that minor
inconsistencies between an applicant's testimony and his asylum
application cannot support an adverse credibility finding. 320 Given the
probability that a noncitizen who may not speak English or be able to
secure assistance by an attorney may submit an asylum application
without fully understanding its content or importance, immigration
judges and the judiciary should make certain that any statement made in
an asylum application and later admitted to be false was clearly intended
as a false statement at the time it was written.
D.

Only Testimonial Evidence that Directly Contradictsa Material,
IntentionallyFalse Statement in an Asylum Application Should
Support a § 1158(d)(6) Finding

Whether testimonial evidence-standing alone-should suffice to
support a frivolousness finding is a more difficult issue than the
adequacy of forged documents or admissions of falsehood.
Theoretically, a frivolousness determination could rest on at least four
types of testimonial findings: (1) a discrepancy between an alien's
testimony and a statement in his asylum application, (2) an inconsistency
318. See, e.g., Jim Morris, EASY PREY/OperatorsPrey Upon Immigrants/Help with INS Sold by
Rogue "Notarios",HOUSTON CHRON., March 27, 1995, at AI (discussing problem of immigrants

with valid asylum claims being tricked by fake lawyers who file false claims with the INS); Maria
Puente, A Tougher Line on PoliticalAsylum: New System Will Take Aim at Fraud, USA TODAY,

Feb. 10, 1994, at 2A (reporting that asylum officers in certain cities receive as many as 300
fraudulent applications per month, prepared by self-styled "consultants"); Patrick J. McDonnell,
Couple Charged With Filing 2,601 FraudulentRequests for Asylum, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1994, at
34 (reporting that couple tricked illegal immigrants into thinking they were applying for work

permits but then submitted fraudulent applications for asylum).
319. See infra notes 322-339.
320. See, e.g., Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Minor

inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the basis of an applicant's alleged fear of
persecution, go to the heart of the asylum claim, or reveal anything about an asylum applicant's fear
for his safety are insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding."); Garrovillas v. INS, 156
F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "inconsistencies of less than substantial importance

for which a plausible explanation is offered" cannot serve as the sole basis for an adverse credibility
finding).
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inherent in an alien's testimony that does not contradict a statement in
his application, (3) a discrepancy between an alien's testimony and that
of a supporting witness or a document that does not contradict a
statement in the alien's application, and (4) an implausibility in an
alien's relation of events that does not contradict a statement in his
application. To comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) and 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.20, only the first of these testimonial inconsistencies should
potentially suffice to support a frivolousness finding, because "an
asylum application is frivolous [only] if any of its material elements is
deliberately fabricated. 32 1
This conclusion is supported by the Third Circuit's decision in
Muhanna 322 and the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Mingkid v. U.S.
Attorney General.32 3 In Muhanna, the court stressed that, to support a
finding of frivolousness, the
fabrication must relate to a material element
324
of the asylum application:

[U]nder 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 a finding of frivolousness does not
flow
automatically
from
an
adverse
credibility
determination.... Inconsistencies between testimony and an
asylum application, while certainly relevant to a credibility
determination that may result in the denial of an applicant's
asylum claim, do not equate to a frivolousness finding under
Section 1158(d)(6), which carries with it much greater
consequences.325
The Eleventh Circuit adopted this holding in Mingkid.326
Limiting eligible testimonial inconsistencies to those that directly
contradict a material element of an asylum application is consistent with
8 C.F.R. § 208.20327 and effectively limits the universe of possible
findings that can support a frivolousness determination to those that
actually show the application to be fraudulent. Under this interpretation
of 8 C.F.R. § 208.20, internal inconsistencies in an alien's testimony that
do not directly contradict a statement on her asylum application cannot
substantiate a frivolousness determination. The same principle should
321. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2007) (emphasis added).
322. See Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2005).
323. See 468 F.3d 763, 770-71 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
324. See 399 F.3d at 589.
325. Id. (emphasis added).
326. See 468 F.3d at 770.
327. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 ("For purposes of this section, an asylum application is frivolous if any of
its material elements is deliberately fabricated.").
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disqualify, as support for a finding under § 1158(d)(6), any
implausibilities in the alien's testimony, as well as any discrepancies
between an alien's testimony and the testimony of other witnesses or
documentary evidence that do not contradict a material element of the
alien's asylum application. A noncitizen's testimony of details of
persecution not relayed in her asylum application also should not support
a frivolousness finding.328
If an alien's testimony contradicts a statement in her asylum
application, then the immigration judge must determine the materiality
of that statement to her claim for refuge. No federal court 329 has
delineated a clear definition of materiality, but guidance may be derived
from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Chen v. Gonzales330 and the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mingkid.33' In Chen, the court held that
testimonial inconsistencies that detract from an alien's claim of
persecution or fail to call into question the primary incident of
persecution for which the alien is seeking asylum cannot support a
finding under § 1158(d)(6). 33 2 The court stressed that details "of only
background interest" 333 and those not "germane to the crucial issue in
this case, 334 do not strike the heart of an applicant's claim for refuge,
and therefore they cannot form the basis for an adverse credibility
finding. Citing the element of materiality in 8 C.F.R. § 208.20, the Chen

328. See Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that "asylum
forms 'filled out by... people who.., are unable to retain counsel' should be read charitably,
especially when it comes to the absence of a comprehensive and thorough account of all past
instances of persecution") (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990)); cf
Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 1996) ("It is well settled that an applicant's
testimony is not per se lacking in credibility simply because it includes details that are not set forth
in the asylum application.").
329. In In re Y-L-, the Board did not explicitly define materiality but did include a citation and
parenthetical to Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 553-54 (2d Cir. 2005), which stated that "a
concealment or misrepresentation is material if it has 'a natural tendency to influence[,] or was
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed."' In re
Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 159 (2007) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)).
The Board also defined, by inference, "material fabrications" as "not mere incidental or tangential
discrepancies or omissions." Id. The Board found that the element of materiality was met where the
immigration judge found that information in an original asylum application was a "glaring
inconsistency" when compared to the new claim in the amended application. Id.
330. 447 F.3d 468 (6th Cir 2006).
331. 468 F.3d 763 (11 th Cir. 2006).
332. Chen, 447 F.3d at 474-76.
333. Id. at 475.
334. Id.
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court also found the inconsistencies not sufficiently material to support a
finding under § 1158(d)(6).335
In Mingkid, the court suggested, but did not hold, that material
discrepancies should go to the heart of the specific incidents for which
the alien is claiming asylum. 336 On appeal, the Mingkid brothers

conceded that their hearing testimony contained minor inconsistencies
but argued that the discrepancies were too trivial to support a
frivolousness determination.3 37 The immigration judge admitted that
many discrepancies did not "go directly to the specific incidents [the
aliens] testified about as being the reason they were requesting
asylum. '3 3 8 Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted the seemingly
trivial discrepancies between the brothers' testimony but found it
unnecessary to determine the materiality of the inconsistencies, because
339
the immigration judge failed to satisfy other elements of the statute.

If a noncitizen's testimony contradicts a material aspect of her asylum
application, then the immigration judge must determine whether clear
and convincing evidence establishes that the inconsistency qualifies as a
fabrication, and, if so, whether the fabrication was deliberate.34 ° Whether
a testimonial inconsistency should qualify as a deliberate fabrication
may depend upon the number of inconsistencies, how central they are to
the alien's claim of persecution as set forth in the asylum application, the
degree of consistency of the rest of the alien's testimony, and whether
the alien possesses any corroborating evidence. And, as referenced in the
previous discussion about admissions of falsehoods,341 a court also

335. Id. at 476-77.
336. See Mingkid, 468 F.3d at 770; see also Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937, 945 (8th Cir.
2006) (finding that fabrications were material because they "relate[d] directly to the issue of past
persecution and also to the issue of the likelihood of future persecution"); Muhanna v. Gonzales,
399 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 2005) (stressing that, under 8 C.F.R. § 208.20, the immigration judge
must conduct a full review of an alien's asylum application before concluding that any
inconsistency is so material that it renders the application frivolous).
337. Mingkid, 468 F.3d at 769.
338. Id. at 770 (alteration omitted). The judge highlighted inconsistencies in the brothers'
testimony regarding their father's occupation, their relationship to a cousin allegedly burned by
Muslims, with whom the brothers lived in Indonesia, and where their grandparents resided. Id.
339. Id. ("Even assuming that the [immigration judge] believed all of the inconsistencies he noted
to be 'material' for the purposes of the frivolity determination, the [judge] did not make the
sufficiently specific findings required by 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 as to which material elements of the
Mingkids' applications for asylum were deliberately fabricated.").
340. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2007).
341. See supra notes 312-318 and accompanying text.
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should evaluate the plausibility of any explanation offered by the asylum
applicant to explain the inconsistencies.
In Muhanna, the Third Circuit read 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 to require a
judge to assess an asylum applicant's explanation for any discrepancy or
implausibility. 342 The court found that
the explanation [the alien] offered for the inconsistent testimony
appears plausible when viewed in light of the fact that Muhanna
had no culpable motivation to make up the story about the street
fight. After all, the incident as described in the asylum
application and in his ultimate testimony was more helpful to his
cause than his intermediate statements. For him to lie on his
application and then to abandon that lie for a denial that any
stabbing had occurred, and then for a story less helpful to his
cause, appear to make far less sense than his explanation that the
story on the application was true but that he was afraid of telling
the truth at the hearing. Hence the inconsistency in his testimony
does not necessarily support a finding that the application was
false, but rather tends only to show 343
that Muhanna was not
credible at one point during the hearing.
In evaluating the plausibility of the asylum applicant's explanation,
the court appeared to review the record de novo, and not under the
highly deferential standard of substantial evidence. This heightened
standard of review appeared to be the court's attempt to ensure that the
evidence was of a sufficiently high evidentiary quality to support the
severity of the sanction-a344 function traditionally performed by an
evidentiary burden of proof.

It is not clear whether Efe v. Ashcroft,345 a Fifth Circuit decision in
which the court upheld a frivolous finding primarily on the basis of
testimonial inconsistencies, is consistent with the proposition that only a
testimonial inconsistency that directly contracts an intentionally false,
material element of an asylum application can support a finding under
§ 1158(d)(6).346 The court reported that

342. Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 588 (3d Cir. 2005).
343. Id.
344. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,423 (1979).
345. 293 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 2002).
346. Later decisions have cited Efe for the proposition that tangible evidence of fraud is necessary
to support a finding under § 1158(d)(6). See Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir.

2006); Kifleyesus v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 937, 944-45 (8th Cir. 2006). These cases characterize Efe
as turning on the presence of dental records that refuted Efe's allegations of his age when he entered
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[t]he main thrust of Efe's story [was] that he was involved in a
political demonstration in Edo, Nigeria, in which he killed a
of months
police officer. Efe ran from the police for a number
3 47
before boarding a ship that brought him to the U.S.
Efe's testimony included internal inconsistencies that went to the heart
of his claim of persecution: he wavered as to his knowledge of the
political party of which he allegedly was a member, 348 the reason he
attended the demonstration at which he was allegedly beaten by a
government official,3 49 the injuries he suffered,3 5 ° the number of officers
who took part in or witnessed the event,35 ' the identity of the officer who
beat him, 352 the date he discovered that the officer died from the
wound,353 and his means of escape from the demonstration.3 54 The court
does not detail what Efe alleged in his asylum application. Therefore, it
is impossible to determine with certainty whether Efe's testimony
directly contradicted a statement in his application or whether it merely
was internally inconsistent. However, given that Efe's claim for refuge
the United States. See id. But the only discussion of the dental records occurs in reference to a
December 1998 hearing, in which the immigration judge found that Efe was "generally credible
regarding his version of the demonstration, stabbing of the officer, and flight"-the events that
formed the basis of Efe's claim for refuge-but noted that, "based on dental records and
observations of Efe during the hearing, the [judge] explicitly questioned Efe's claim that he was
thirteen when he arrived in the U.S." Efe, 293 F.3d at 901; see also id. at 902 n.l (noting that, in
contrast to Efe's testimony, one dental report concluded that there was an 88.6% chance that Efe
was eighteen years old or older when he entered the United States, and another report showed a
57.5% to 73% chance that he was over eighteen). While the immigration judge "attributed Efe's
vagueness about his age and birth date to attempts to mislead the court," the judge apparently did
not make an adverse credibility finding on this basis. See id. at 901. This interpretation of Efe is
supported by the Board's remand of the case to the immigration judge in June 2000 upon finding
"previously unavailable material evidence [that] called into question the credibility of Efe's story."
Id. at 902. The new evidence, a State Department telegram resulting from an investigation by the
U.S. Embassy, was ultimately deemed to be of "limited probative value." See id. at 902, 903. When
the Fifth Circuit upheld the immigration judge's frivolousness finding made at the August 2000
hearing, id. at 903, the court only noted that "Efe has gone back and forth with the facts and
misrepresented his case several times." Id. at 908. The court did not reference the dental records, so
the surfacing of these records likely played a minor, if any, role in the court's analysis under
§ 1158(d)(6). See id.
347. Efe, 293 F.3d at 901.
348. Id. at 905.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 901.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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apparently arose from one encounter with the Nigerian police, it is
probable that his inconsistent testimony contradicted details of the event
as described in his asylum application. If that assumption proves true,
then the materiality of the inconsistencies-as well as the number of
discrepancies and apparent dearth of consistent testimony central to his
claim of persecution-may constitute clear and convincing evidence that
Efe deliberately fabricated a material element of his asylum application.
E.

Findingsof Demeanor Should Be Legally Ineligible to Support a
DeterminationUnder § 1158(d)(6)

The case law does not squarely address whether an alien's demeanor,
standing alone, may constitute adequate support for a finding under
§ 1158(d)(6). Demeanor-based findings stem from an immigration
judge's subjective evaluation of an asylum seeker's manner while
testifying. Demeanor, or non-verbal communication signals, 355 includes
an alien's expression, tone of voice, level of emotion, speed of speech,
degree of attentiveness, body movements such as fidgeting or shifting,
and lack of eye contact.356 Given the inherent subjectivity of findings of
demeanor, courts should hold that immigration judges cannot rely upon
an asylum seeker's demeanor to support a frivolousness finding.
Efe suggests that an immigration judge may consider an asylum
applicant's demeanor in determining whether he knowingly filed a
frivolous application for refuge.357 The Fifth Circuit noted that the
immigration judge's "observations of Efe during the hearing" led him to
believe that Efe was attempting to mislead the court. 358 The judge also
"pointed to Efe's demeanor in court" as evidence that he was lying.359
355. See Kagan, supra note 202, at 378.
356. For instance, an immigration judge rested an adverse credibility finding on this string of
observations in a 2002 case reviewed by the Ninth Circuit:
[T]here was an unnatural manner in [the asylum seeker's] delivery of her testimony without the
occasional pauses one would expect while she stopped to remember the details of terrible

experiences. There was no visible change in her countenance or signs of emotional upheaval
except at one point later in the proceedings.
Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002).
357. Efe, 293 F.3d at 901. But cf Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 588-99 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding that an adverse credibility determination, which included the demeanor-based finding that

the alien was "someone who is not honest at all" was insufficient to support a frivolousness finding
without the immigration judge's identification of which material element of the application had

been fabricated).
358. Efe, 293 F.3d at 901.
359. Seeid. at902 n.1.
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While the court did not cite the judge's findings of demeanor in
not hold that such
affirming the frivolousness determination, it did
360
findings may not be considered as a matter of law.
Evaluations of demeanor depend on the individual adjudicator's
perception and disposition. Demeanor-based findings often lack an
articulated logic and are inherently unreviewable on appeal.3 61 A
determination that a person is not truthful may simply represent an
immigration judge's "gut feeling. 3 62 Reviewing courts afford "special
deference" to a judge's demeanor-based findings in acknowledgment of
the visual and auditory information available to the judge as an eye
witness to the alien's testimony.36 3 While "special deference" does not
denote a complete absence of judicial scrutiny, the reviewing court
"certainly cannot expect that the factual basis for eyewitness
364
observations always will find support in the hearing transcript.,
Therefore, an immigration judge's evaluation of an asylum applicant's
non-verbal cues-as an indicator of the essential merit of her claim of
persecution-is essentially unassailable on appeal.

360. See id. at 908.
361. See generally Aubra Fletcher, The Real ID Act: Furthering Gender Bias in US. Asylum
Law, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 111, 121-22 (2006) (discussing the role of demeanor in
credibility determinations); James C. Hathaway & William S. Hicks, Is There a Subjective Element
in the Refugee Convention's Requirement of "Well-Founded Fear"?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 505,
517-34 (2005) (critiquing subjective, inconsistent demeanor-based judgments within the context of
a well-founded fear inquiry); Guy Coffey, The Credibility of Credibility Evidence at the Refugee
Review Tribunal, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 377, 387-88 (2003) (analyzing the role of demeanor in
decisions of the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal, which reviews asylum decisions); Kagan,
supra note 202, at 367 (analyzing principles from international refugee law that govem credibility
assessments and proposing that appellate tribunals should review how first instance decision-makers
make credibility assessments); Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in
Credibility Evaluation of Asylum Applicants, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1991/92) (discussing
factors leading to erroneous adverse credibility determinations and advocating for the United States
to follow Canada's lead in adopting a benefit of the doubt standard).
362. See Kagan, supra note 202, at 375-76 (discussing problems of subjective credibility
assessments). One striking example of a "gut level" demeanor-based finding is this assertion by a
United Nations Human Civil Rights officer in Kenya: "I can understand if someone is lying or not
in the first minute of the interview." Id. at 375. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill observes that "[d]ecisionmakers commonly rely on instinct and a feel for credibility, but with inadequate attention to the
problems of assessment, identification of material facts, the weight of the evidence, and standards of
proof." Id. at 377 (quoting GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (2d
ed. 1996)).
363. See, e.g., Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 2003); Paredes-Urrestarazu
v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 818 (9th Cir. 1994).
364. Paredes-Urrestarazu, 36 F.3d at 818.
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Cultural misunderstandings and biases likely affect findings of
demeanor. The application of Western norms of truthfulness is unlikely
to yield an accurate assessment of credibility where the asylum applicant
speaks through an interpreter, derives from a culture with different
norms of verbal and non-verbal expression, and-potentially having
been abused by authorities in the past-may fear or distrust the
adjudicator. 365 As Aubra Fletcher persuasively argues,
[W]hen [immigration judges] base negative credibility
determinations solely on demeanor, they ultimately privilege
their individual ideas of how refugees should psychologically
respond to persecution over evidentiary considerations. Not all
people react the same way to experiences of rape, domestic
violence, torture or any other harm, and responses can vary
widely according to gender, culture, age, class, and other factors.
Asylum cases often present unique36 6combinations of cultural
elements and post-trauma symptoms.
More generally, "[u]nderstandable anxiety affects most claimants
compelled to367recount painful facts in a formal and foreign
environment."
Finally, criminal justice and psychological research demonstrates that
credibility assessments based on non-verbal cues are often wrong.
Summarizing the findings of studies with law enforcement personnel,
Michael Kagan reports:
[R]esearch with police officers has shown that only a minority
can reliably detect lies in criminal suspects based on observing
nonverbal cues alone, and those relying on body movements
such as twitches, hand movements, and voice patterns are often
the most inaccurate. In some studies, police performed little
better than chance and no better than untrained subjects at
police had more confidence in their
detecting lies, although
368
lies.
detect
to
ability

365. See Coffey, supranote 361, at 387.
366. Fletcher, supra note 361, at 121.
367. Hathaway & Hicks, supra note 361, at 518 (quoting Kopalapillai v. Minister for Immigr. and
Multicultural Aff., [1997] F.C.A. 1510 (Fed. Ct. 1997) (Merkel, J.) (Austl.)).
368. Kagan, supra note 202, at 379 (discussing the study in Aldert Vrij & Samantha Mann,
Telling and Detecting Lies in a High-stake Situation: The Case of a Convicted Murderer, 15
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 187 (2001)).
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Indeed, psychological studies confirm that most369people cannot discern
truth from falsehood through non-verbal signals.
The severity of the sanction at issue in § 1158(d)(6) warrants
disqualifying demeanor-based findings as the sole basis for a
frivolousness finding. Even if the reliability of these findings was not
called into question by social science, the inability of a reviewing court
to evaluate the accuracy of a demeanor-based finding renders sole
reliance on them inappropriate as a matter of law.37 °
In sum, the federal courts that have interpreted and applied
§ 1158(d)(6) have stressed the importance of probative, reliable evidence
to support a finding of frivolousness. Most of the evidentiary standards
developed in the case law are consistent with a burden of proof of clear
and convincing evidence. My proposal for which kinds of evidence
should satisfy the statutory elements of fabrication and intent, and which
evidence should be rejected, is loosely consistent with courts' reasoning.
My proposal goes farther, however, in urging courts to hold that
implausibilities and internal inconsistencies in an applicant's testimony
do not meet the criteria for frivolousness. In addition, courts should hold
demeanor-based findings ineligible as a matter of law as support for a
frivolousness determination under a clear and convincing standard.

369. Id.; see also Juliet Cohen, Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepanciesand Errors of
Recall in the Testimony of Asylum Seekers, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 308 (2001); Paul Ekman et
al., Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991); Aldert Vrij, Detecting the Liars, 14 THE
PSYCHOL. 596 (2001); Mark G. Frank, Assessing Deception: Implicationsfor the Courtroom, 2 JUD.
REV. 315. (1996); Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon, Factors Affecting Assessments of Witness
Credibility, in THE PSYCHOL. OF THE COURTROOM 169, 191 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray
eds., 1982).
370. The disqualification of demeanor-based findings in other parts of the law should inform
courts' decision about whether these findings should be ineligible to support findings under
§ 1158(d).
For instance, a person's failure to make eye contact cannot be considered as support for
reasonable suspicion in the context of a Terry stop. See Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1446
(9th Cir. 1994) ("Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever upheld the legality of a
detention based upon an officer's unsupported intuition, and we refuse to do so now." (internal
alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1973)). In United
States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit explained that, where a factor
and its opposite may both be used to justify a stop, the court should not give weight to either factor.
A driver's failure to look at a border patrol car is such a factor since the opposite reaction-a
driver's obvious attention to a border patrol vehicle-may also be used to justify reasonable
suspicion. Id. The court found that to allow this type ofjustification to support a stop "would put the
officers in a classic 'heads I win, tails you lose' position [and] the driver, of course, can only lose."
Id. at 712 (citation omitted). The court concluded that "[r]easonable suspicion should not turn on the
ophthalmological reactions of the [driver]." Id. (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
In its decision of April 25, 2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals
committed plain constitutional error. Noting that a finding under
§ 1158(d)(6) "is a preemptive determination which, once made, forever
bars an alien from any benefit under the Act," the Board did not deem
37 1
these "severe consequences" to warrant an elevated burden of proof.
Instead, the Board held that the government must only establish that a
noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application by a
preponderance of the evidence. 372 Its discussion of the applicable burden
of proof was devoid of any constitutional analysis.
The Supreme Court has made clear that residents of the United States,
even noncitizens, cannot be deprived of significant liberty or property
interests without a showing of clear and convincing evidence. A
determination under § 1158(d)(6) "involves issues basic to human
liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which
aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself. ' 373 Because the liberty
interests at stake are so fundamental,374 the Due Process Clause compels
the government to prove that a noncitizen knowingly filed a frivolous
asylum application by clear and convincing evidence before imposing
such a sanction. An elevated burden of proof is particularly warranted in
this context because determinations under § 1158(d)(6) have a high
potential for error: the findings are made in adjudications in which
subjective judgments are necessary and the asylum seeker is not
guaranteed assistance of counsel.
Utilizing the three-pronged approach delineated in Mathews v.
Eldridge-and informed by the Supreme Court's consideration of the
proper burden of proof in deportation proceedings,375 denaturalization
proceedings,376 and expatriation determinations 377-federal
courts of
371. In re Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 157 (B.I.A. 2007).
372. Id. at 157-58.
373. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
374. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (holding that the clear and
appropriate for safeguarding those interests "both 'particularly
than mere loss of money' (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.

283 (1990); see also Santosky v.
convincing evidence standard is
important' and 'more substantial
418, 424 (1979)).

375. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
376. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118, 123 (1943).
377. Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 921 (1955). The Court has also held that the government
must meet an intermediate burden of proof in state proceedings to sever parental rights, Santosky,

Administrative "Death Sentence"
appeals must reject the Board's gap-filling measure and hold that the
constitution compels that a finding under § 1158(d)(6) be supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Concrete and demonstrable evidence of
fraud should satisfy this standard, while an immigration judge's
observations of the asylum seeker's demeanor and most testimonial
inconsistencies should be held constitutionally inadequate given their
inherent unreliability and inconsistency with regulatory criteria. These
evidentiary standards are mandated by the principles ensconced in the
Due Process Clause and are necessary to safeguard the fundamental, and
378
fragile, liberty interests of noncitizens alleging persecution.

455 U.S. 745, and in civil commitment proceedings, Addington, 441 U.S. 418.

378. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
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